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Smart Guns, the Law, and the Second
Amendment
Dru Stevenson*
ABSTRACT
Smart guns, which originally meant personalized guns that only the
owner could fire, had a false start as a promising new technology several
years ago. Nevertheless, policymakers have shown renewed interest in the
wake of highly publicized incidents of gun violence, as well as advances
in technology. The first generation of smart guns foundered on problems
with the reliability of the technology, as well as a legislative misstep that
would have banned all other guns as soon as smart guns appeared in the
retail market. This proposal triggered massive boycotts of certain
manufacturers and dealers and a subsequent abandonment of the project
by the gun industry overall. Newer technologies, however, such as
improved biometric grip identifiers, precision-guided rifles that rarely
miss, blockchain or “glockchain” automated tracking, and optical scopes
that send videos to smartphones, have revived interest in smart gun
products. At least one state in 2019 (New Jersey) passed carefully drafted
legislation promoting the introduction of personalized guns, while another
(Arizona) passed legislation discouraging the adoption of digital ledgering
technology for firearms. In addition, some leading candidates in the 2020
primary advocated for smart guns as a solution to gun violence. This paper
will explore the emerging second-generation smart gun technology, its
potential for adoption by the military, law enforcement, and civilian
markets, and the realistic prospects for improvements in safety or
reduction in gun violence. This discussion will include the disconnect
between policy agendas regarding firearm safety and technological
enhancements driven by current consumer demand—and the murky moral
assumptions that undergird both.

*Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law – Houston. The author would like
to thank the editors of the Penn State Law Review for the opportunity to publish and for
their excellent editorial work, which significantly improved the manuscript. Research
assistants Greta Carlson and Sofia Colorado provided invaluable assistance with this
project.
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Constructive debate about gun policy continues to falter in part
because of basic disagreement over what the right to keep and bear
arms is for. Consider “smart guns” – weapons that work only when
activated by an authorized user. Reaction to even the availability of
such weapons, much less their requirement, and been swift and
caustic.1

I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine a gun that cannot miss, or a gun that only the owner can fire.
Imagine decentralized, blockchain-based background checks for gun
purchases, as well as owner registration and concealed carry permits, not
controlled by any individual, but more reliable than the current FBIadministered system.2 Technological improvements to existing products
and tools can make guns safer, more effective, or more interactive for the
user or with other tools and products. Emerging technology for firearms—
so-called “smart guns” and related electronic firearm accessories—run
along these same three lines. Some smart gun technology is meant to
enhance safety, as with personalized guns shootable only by a designated
user, or computerized gun safes or locking holsters.3 Other smart gun
technology does the opposite, at least arguably, by making firearms more
lethal, through enhanced accuracy and power.4 A third emerging line of
1. JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A. H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT:
RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER 151 (2018).
2. See Anthony W. Metzler, Note, Triggered: Mass Shootings, Smart Gun
Technology and the Search for Solutions, 19 J. HIGH TECH. L. 103, 111 (2018).
3. See Matt Schroeder, New Technologies and Small Arms Control: Preventing
Unauthorized Acquisition and Use, in BEHIND THE CURVE: NEW TECHNOLOGIES, NEW
CONTROL CHALLENGES 75, 82–88 (Benjamin King & Glenn McDonald eds., Small Arms
Survey 2015), available at https://bit.ly/2UDeKau; see also FRANK MINITER, THE FUTURE
OF THE GUN 227–33 (2014) (discussing personalized smart guns).
4. See MINITER, supra note 3, at 48–53 (describing TrackingPoint rifles).
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smart gun technology permits interactivity, such as live-streaming the
view from the gun’s scope,5 or by tracking discharges, location, and gun
possession through online blockchain ledgers.6 Interactivity, in turn, paves
the way for a fourth line of emerging firearm technology: automated
recording, memorializing, and archiving events for subsequent replay,
which can enhance accountability (say, for police shootings of unarmed
suspects)7 and justification, corroborating an otherwise disputable claim
that a shooting was in self-defense. All these technologies are potentially
disruptive for the legal regime governing firearm possession and use—a
legal arena already fraught with intense controversy.
Reforming gun policy, and gun culture, in the United States is a
source of ongoing political divisiveness and acrimony. Firearm
technology interacts in complex ways with the Second Amendment,8 the
evolving common law surrounding the Second Amendment in the lower
courts, and in statutes, administrative regulations, and law enforcement.
Congressional enactments in the last two decades have elevated gun rights
over other legal rules and legal authorities, such as common law tort
liability,9 meaning the prospect of tort liability and the duty of care has not
driven the introduction of safety features with firearms as it has with other
consumer products. From a market standpoint, some of the emerging
firearm technologies are dependent on proposed statutory or regulatory
mandates for the adoption of new safety features. Alternatively, rather than
depending on legal requirements to encourage its adoption, other emerging
technology functions either as a workaround to existing legal restrictions
and bottlenecks or as a means for thwarting existing laws or policy. The
academic literature to date about “smart guns” focuses exclusively on
personalized firearms or electronically controlled safety mechanisms
(ECSMs)—weapons that only the owner or a designated user can fire.10
The technology has existed in various forms for many years, but it has
been evolving, and other “smart” technologies for firearms have now
emerged.

5. See id. at 22–24.
6. See Robin Kester, Demystifying the Internet of Things: Industry Impact,
Standardization Problems, and Legal Considerations, 8 ELON L. REV. 205, 215 (2016)
(discussing this technology as adopted by two police departments).
7. See MINITER, supra note 3, at 232–33.
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. II.
9. See Stephen P. Teret, Key Perspectives and Insights on Personalized Guns, in
PERSONALIZED FIREARMS AND ELECTRONIC SAFETY DEVICES: PERSPECTIVES 24, 28 (Small
Arms Survey 2013), available at https://bit.ly/2ycfEmN.
10. See DAVID HEMENWAY, PRIVATE GUNS, PUBLIC HEALTH 226 (2d ed. 2017) (“The
regulatory agency should actively promote new technology that will make society safer.
For example, ‘smart’ or personalized guns that cannot be fired except by authorized users
can help prevent unintentional injuries of children and adolescents and limit criminal use
of stolen guns.”).
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Weapons, considered a type of technology, inherently pose both
moral hazard and adverse selection issues, as do some other technologies.
From a moral hazard standpoint, having a gun brings feelings of
confidence, security,11 and sometimes even dominance. Depending on
your position on gun rights, this feeling is either the essence of
“freedom,”12 or a dangerous delusion. Either way, whether consciously or
unconsciously, those who believe they have reduced or eliminated their
odds of injury or premature death will take more risks than they would
otherwise. With guns, this might mean walking alone in high-crime
neighborhoods after dark;13 standing up for yourself in an argument or, in
the face of an affront, intervening to help others who seem to be in danger;
or to give vent to your indignation at rude drivers on the road. When we
insure or ensure ourselves against some harm, we simply do not need to
be as careful to avoid it. Adverse selection is a screening effect: suppose,
hypothetically, that the people you would least want to have guns are the
most likely to want them, and are disproportionately likely to obtain them.
There are individual exceptions, of course, in any moral hazard or adverse
selection scenario—some individuals will continue to be cautious even
when their risks are low, and some low-risk individuals will opt into the
risk pool. Some cautious, safe, self-controlled, dispassionate people own
guns. Moral hazard and adverse selections are about the general tendency
of a group taken together.
The four smart gun technologies discussed below each purport to
either make guns safer by preventing misuse, making guns more lethal by
maximizing accuracy, or validating the legitimacy of firing a gun for afterthe-fact inquiries. The ensuing discussion attempts to explain each of these
emerging smart gun technologies, and to situate them in their legal and
social context. A secondary, more normative agenda is also present:
notwithstanding the advantages these new technologies afford, each one
can intensify the moral hazard and adverse selection problems that are
inherent in firearm ownership. For example, a smart gun with electronic
safeguards against theft or misuse allows the owner to be more carefree
about her gun than she would otherwise be (the moral hazard problem).
Similarly, by reducing the likelihood of theft, the accidental death of one’s
children, or a grab-away shooting, it further skews the me-versus-others
internal calculus that drives adverse selection. Additionally, a gun with
electronics to make it infallibly accurate, and therefore super-lethal, will
appeal the most to those who are most bent on killing (adverse selection),
and ratchet up the confidence boost or power trip that guns already provide
(moral hazard). Further, a gun that vindicates the shooter after a killing
11. See MINITER, supra note 3, at 233–34.
12. See id.
13. See id.
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would do the same—making the owner less hesitant to shoot and appealing
disproportionately to those most likely to shoot.
The following discussion will arrange topics by type of technology:
personalized smart guns (authorized-user trigger locks), sophisticated
precision-guided firearms, recordkeeping guns, and “glockchain”
(blockchain ledgering) guns. Part II focuses on personalized smart guns,
the most-discussed type of smart gun technology. Given the longstanding
and ongoing controversy over this type of smart gun, and the repeated but
unsuccessful incidents of government intervention to spur the
development of these products, this will be the longest section of the
article. Most academic and legal literature up to now uses the term “smart
gun” synonymously with electronically personalized guns;14 the technical
term in international military contexts for these weapons is ECSMs.15 The
promise these devices have for reducing firearm injuries and fatalities
makes their deficiencies and unmarketability all the more frustrating.
One of the goals of this symposium contribution is to expand the
common understanding of “smart guns” to include other emerging firearm
technologies that could prove just as disruptive to the industry—and to
firearm policy—as ECSMs or personalized smart guns. In this vein, Part
III discusses a newer and far less familiar type of smart gun, what I will
call “Guns That Cannot Miss”16 (though the technical terminology would
be precision-guided firearms),17 a subset of autonomous weapons systems
14. See, e.g., Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment in the Twenty-First Century:
What Hath Heller Wrought?, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1143, 1175–76 (2015); Philip
J. Cook & James A. Leitzel, “Smart” Guns: A Technological Fix for Regulating the
Secondary Market, 20 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 38, 39 (2002); Adam Crepelle, Concealed
Carry to Reduce Sexual Violence Against American Indian Women, 26 KAN. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 236, 254–55 (2017) (advocating arming Native American women with smart guns
to defend themselves against sexual violence); Barack Obama, The President’s Role in
Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 857–58 (2017) (“We’ve also
jumpstarted the development of smart gun technology. As long as we’ve got technology to
prevent a criminal from stealing and using your smartphone, then we should be able to
prevent the wrong person – including kids – from pulling the trigger on a gun.”); William
F. Godbold IV, Note, Constitutional Law – Shooting Blanks: Smart Gun Mandates and
Their Concomitant Constitutional, Regulatory, Public Policy, and Practical Issues, 37 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 167, 169 (2014); Tyler J. Kimberly, Comment, A Higher
Caliber of Regulation: Is Making Smart-Gun Technology Mandatory Constitutionally
Permissible?, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 251, 253–54 (2014); Jessica M. Lujan, Note, HalfCocked: “Smart Gun” Mandates Are Premature and Unconstitutional Under the
Prevailing “Undue Burden” Test, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 500, 501–05 (2018); BLOCHER
& MILLER, supra note 1 at 151; HEMENWAY, supra note 10 at 226; Metzler, supra note 2,
at 111.
15. See Schroeder, supra note 3, at 82.
16. See Mark Dewey, A New ‘Smart Rifle’ Decides When to Shoot and Rarely Misses,
NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (May 15, 2013), https://n.pr/2UIW1tY.
17. See Mike Gassaway, Touring Trackingpoint’s Facility, Where Precision Guided
Firearms Are Made [Videos], GUNS.COM (Aug. 14, 2018, 8:00 AM),
https://bit.ly/39pOS7g (video tour of facilities of the manufacturer of civilian-marketed
precision-guided firearms, with discussion of the weapons).
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(AWS).18 These sophisticated weapons use computer processing and
advanced optics to lock on targets—including moving targets—and to
correct for wind, humidity, Coriolis effect, rifle cant, weight of the
cartridge, and even the absence of light. High-end models can hit a moving
target in the dark at 1400 yards (about eight-tenths of a mile),19 even with
an unskilled shooter. They also enable an operator at a remote location to
fire the gun while another person merely carries it on location and points
it toward the target. Naturally, such weapons are especially appealing for
military use,20 but they are available for the civilian market, though outside
the price range of most gun purchasers. Even so, these next-generation
weapons with super-lethality could force our legal system to revisit longheld assumptions about the proper line between intentional and
unintentional homicides, attempted versus completed crimes, the right of
self-defense, police shootings of fleeing suspects, and even the presumed
sporting virtues of hunting.21
Part IV discusses the emerging technology of guns that track
everything—not only audio/video uploads from the scope, but also
nuanced movement tracking, similar to the “black box” in an automobile
that constantly records speed, acceleration, braking, and turns. These guns
record (often in encrypted form) every discharge, but also the angle and
location at the instant of discharge, every movement of the gun before and
after discharge, and so on. Creating such a record presents enhanced
accountability for law enforcement, similar to the policy rationales for
police bodycams, and could also assist with documenting the justifications
for shootings, thus validating a subsequent claim of self-defense by a
civilian gun owner. Finally, Part V will briefly address emerging gun
blockchain or “glockchain” technology, which of course overlaps with
Part IV on recording the location and usage of the gun—but the online,
anonymous blockchain ledgers could assist with owner registration,
tracing crime guns (chain of custody), locating stolen guns, and even with
18. See Christopher P. Toscano, “Friend of Humans”: An Argument for Developing
Autonomous Weapons Systems, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 189, 232 (2015).
19. See ShadowTrax8, TRACKINGPOINT, https://bit.ly/2QNPLjD (last visited May 19,
2020) (“If you need knock-down power for brown bears or African cats, this is your gun.
If you need battalion-level sniper capabilities in a combat zone, this is your gun. Whatever
your need, with a precision-guided lock range of more than ¾ of a mile, pulling the trigger
on the ShadowTrax8 is like calling in an airstrike.”).
20. See Kyle Mizokami, The U.S. Army’s New Rifle Comes With Tech Found in Tanks
and iPhones, POPULAR MECHS. (June 3, 2019), https://bit.ly/2JjsMbW; Peter Suciu, U.S.
Army Takes Aim at Developing Smart Gun Technology, CLEARANCEJOBS (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://bit.ly/2WLFpo1 (“The Army’s specifications for this next-gen firearm are that it
would be equipped with a “smart rail” system that could provide communications and
power interface between the actual weapon and a computerized onboard system.”).
21. For a thoughtful background discussion about the relationship between lethality
and Second Amendment rights, see Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, Lethality, Public
Carry, and Adequate Alternatives, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 279, 294–300 (2016) [hereinafter
Blocher & Miller, Lethality].
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concealed carry permits, hunting licenses, and firearm purchase
background checks.
There are other new or emerging technologies related to firearms that
also fall outside the scope of this Article, even though they deserve more
academic commentary. These are 3D-printed guns (which are
rudimentary,
not
technologically
sophisticated,
weapons),22
microstamping (serial number imprints on bullet casings that tie each
bullet fired to the gun that discharged it),23 and gunshot or gun detection
technology,24 which uses AI and other technologies to recognize and alert
security or law enforcement personnel instantly to the presence of guns or
where shots have been fired.25 In addition, it seems appropriate at the
22. See, e.g., Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 420 F.Supp.3d 1130, 1136–38 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 12, 2019) (invalidating Trump Administration decision to remove online 3D
gun designs from the United State Munitions List). See generally Jessica Berkowitz,
Computer-Aided Destruction: Regulating 3D-Printed Firearms Without Infringing on
Individual Liberties, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 51, 81–84 (2018) (proposing expansion of
background checks to cover ammunition purchases as the best remedy to the regulatory
challenges posed by 3D-printed firearms); James B. Jacobs & Alex Haberman, 3D-Printed
Firearms, Do-It-Yourself Guns, & The Second Amendment, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129
(2017) (focusing on Second Amendment challenge to the government’s attempt to keep
3D printing firearms software off the Internet); Rory K. Little, Guns Don’t Kill People, 3D
Printing Does? Why the Technology Is a Distraction from Effective Gun Controls, 65
HASTINGS L.J. 1505 (2014) (arguing that gun control advocates should focus primarily on
regulating criminal use of guns, and not on the technology used to manufacture them);
Michael L. Smith, The Second Amendment Implications of Regulating 3D Printed
Firearms, 31 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. 60 (2015) (arguing that most restrictions on 3D
printed firearms will survive Second Amendment challenges).
23. See generally Pena v. Lindley, 898 F.3d 969, 981–86 (9th Cir. 2018) (upholding
California’s microstamping requirement, with a detailed explanation of the technology).
24. See generally Amanda Busljeta, Comment, How an Acoustic Sensor Can Catch
a Gunman, 32 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 211 (2016) (discussing the
acoustic sensor technology and its applications); Daniel S. Lawrence et al., Evaluation of
Gunshot Detection Technology to Aid in the Reduction of Firearms Violence, URBAN INST.
(Oct. 2019) https://bit.ly/2X7Hj2s; Kester, supra note 6, at 215 (“ShotSpotter™ is able to
determine when and where gunshots are fired in public using connected microphones that
are installed throughout a city, town, or college campus. As a result, police may be able to
quickly determine an active shooter’s location . . . [though] this technology is currently
limited to outdoor gunfire . . . .”). See also SHOTSPOTTER INC., https://bit.ly/2JioPV9 (last
visited May 19, 2020).
25. See, e.g., Javed Iqbal et al., Orientation Aware Object Detection with Application
to Firearms (Apr. 22, 2019), available at https://bit.ly/33RyhrG. Numerous courts have
already issued opinions pertaining to police use of the technology. See, e.g., State v.
Harvey, 932 N.W.2d 792, 797 (Minn. 2019) (“A ShotSpotter device detected eleven
gunshots between 12:06:52 a.m. and 12:07:34 a.m. on July 27.”); United States v. Johnson,
365 F.Supp.3d 89, 93 (D.D.C. 2019) (discussing police dispatch based on ShotSpotter
alerting authorities to moving (drive-by) shooter); United States v. Wilcher, 744 F.App’x.
604, 605 (11th Cir. 2018) (“A few minutes later, police officers, 911 callers, and the city’s
Shot Spotter system heard gunfire from a high-powered weapon.”); Commonwealth v.
Raglin, 178 A.3d 868, 872–74 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (holding that police had reasonable
suspicion to detain defendant for shooting detected by shot spotter); Commonwealth v.
Holnesss, 101 N.E.3d 310, 313 (Mass. App. Ct. 2018) (“At 4:10 A.M., six minutes after
the report of the shooting at 92 Wales Street, Boston police were dispatched to respond to
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outset to mention that advanced electronics are not the only technological
advancements happening in the firearm industry. My twelve-month
review of manufacturers’ catalogs or websites and gun enthusiast blogs
that review new gun models suggests that manufacturers are innovating to
meet intense consumer demand for firearms optimized for concealed
carrying, now that all states permit the practice. This means engineering
with new materials and new designs to make guns smaller, lighter, and still
lethal with one shot. Of course, Hollywood depictions of gunslingers
continue to feature large, imposing pistols and rifles for dramatic effect.
Yet pocket-size guns dominate the new product lines from manufacturers
because of the mushrooming number of concealed carriers. On the other
end of the gun companies’ product line are the ever-popular assault rifles,
and for these, the holy grail of manufacturing research and development
might now be larger and larger capacity magazines. Imagine a dependable,
widely-available 200-round magazine for a semi-automatic assault rifle—
a shooter could fire 200 times without reloading. It is on the horizon. The
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office may have a more significant role in the
future of guns in America than the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives (“ATF”) does now.
II. PERSONALIZED SMART GUNS (ELECTRONICALLY CONTROLLED
SAFETY MECHANISMS)
Personalized firearms, to which the words “smart guns” usually refer,
use internal technology to limit use of the gun to authorized users.
Advocates of personalized smart gun technology contend that it could save
many lives by preventing unauthorized usage by criminals and
unsupervised children.26 In theory, if only the owner or other designated
users could fire a gun, then that gun would be rendered useless if stolen or
resold on the black market.27 Unsupervised children could not injure
themselves or others if they find or access an adult’s firearms, and older
adolescents could not take their parents’ or older siblings’ firearms to
school to perpetrate a mass shooting or even settle a score with a rival
classmate.28 In addition, police officers would not be at risk of injury from

a ‘ShotSpotter’ device activation at 276 Talbot Avenue . . . .”); State v. Hill, 851 N.W.2d
670, 774–78 (Neb. 2014) (finding SpotShotter reliable and alerting admissible as evidence
at trial); United States v. Devers, 530 F.App’x. 608, 608 (8th Cir. 2013) (“As relevant, the
trial included the testimony of two police officers who were dispatched to an Omaha
residence after the city’s Shot Spotter system indicated that approximately four shots had
been fired there.”).
26. See HEMENWAY, supra note 10, at 138.
27. See Smart Guns, GIFFORDS LAW CTR., https://bit.ly/3dvYiRT ([last visited]).
28. See id.
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their own firearms if arrestees wrestle or grab the gun away from the
officer.29
A.

The Desire to Save Lives

The concept of an electronically-personalized firearm first appeared
in the mid-1990s as a possible solution to police weapon “takeaways,”
where a police officer is “injured or killed when a criminal wrestles the
officer’s firearm away and uses it against the officer.”30 Such a safeguard
could be especially useful for law enforcement officers—16% of all
officers killed in the line of duty are due to “takeaways” (snatching the
officer’s service weapon and turning it on the officer), or that of another
officer, during an attempted arrest.31 Nevertheless, 20 years after the
invention of the first smart gun, the technology remains underdeveloped
and underused.32
The same authorized-user features would also reduce accidentrelated gun death as well as the suicide rate among youths, and curtail the
number of guns available on the black market. Accidental shootings make
up 18% of all gun injuries and 1.3% of all gun deaths.33 The increasing
demands for ease of use and lower trigger weights in handguns in recent
years have made modern handguns “child’s play” to operate and create a
“greater potential hazard if they end up in the wrong hands.”34 With
personalized smart guns, unintended discharges during cleaning or regular
handling of the gun would be drastically reduced because the weapon
would not be authorized to fire unless held correctly.35 One study of gun
29. See id.; see also HEMENWAY, supra note 10, at 138 (“A smart gun might also help
police, who are sometimes killed with their own service firearms.”).
30. See NAT’L. SHOOTING SPORTS FOUND., “AUTHORIZED USER RECOGNITION”
(A.K.A. “SMART GUN”) TECHNOLOGY (2013), https://bit.ly/3dAudAT; Schroeder, supra
note 3, at 83 (“Equipping firearms with ECSMs could reduce the number of security
officers injured or killed by assailants who gain access to their weapons (or the weapon of
another security officer).”).
31. See D. R. Weiss, Smart Gun Technology Project Final Report, SANDIA NAT’L
LABS., May 1996, at 2, available at https://bit.ly/2Ul9IjQ.
32. See Amy Fawcett, Is Smart Gun Technology Viable? Smart Gun Symposium
Recap, WASH. TECH. INDUSTRY ASS’N (Feb. 4, 2015) https://bit.ly/3btTASY; see also
Schroeder, supra note 3, at 83 (“Nonetheless, sales of firearms equipped with ECSMs have
been modest to date. Some promising technologies are still in development, and it may be
many years before they are available for purchase. Of the 13 ECSMs assessed for their
technological maturity . . . only three were categorized as an ‘Advanced Prototype or
Production-Ready Design.’”).
33. See Gun Violence Statistics, GIFFORDS LAW CTR., https://bit.ly/2vUCL4z (last
visited May 19, 2020).
34. Günter Maximilian Hefner & Karl Friedrich Giebel, Electronic Firearm Safety
Devices, in SMALL ARMS SURVEY, PERSONALIZED FIREARMS AND ELECTRONIC SAFETY
DEVICES: PERSPECTIVES 6, 6 (2013).
35. Unintentional discharges occur most often when the gun owner is cleaning the
gun. (Necessary since already explained cleaning the gun above the line?) See VIOLENCE
POL’Y CTR., “SMART GUNS” BACKGROUNDER 2 (2016).
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deaths in Maryland and Wisconsin found that approximately 37% of
unintended deaths would have been avoided had the guns in question been
personalized.36 Personalized smart guns could also help reduce the number
of childhood gun-related deaths.37 The majority of unintentional shooting
deaths involve people under the age of 24.38 Given that most firearm
injuries to younger children involve guns belonging to their parents or
relatives,39 these shootings could be preventable, as most children would
not be authorized users of a smart gun.40 If only a designated user could
fire any individual gun, then presumably children would be unable to play
with or discharge the guns while unsupervised, and therefore would not
accidentally shoot themselves, their siblings, or friends.41 As Harvard
public health professor, David Hemenway, explains, fewer children would
suffer firearm injuries “if guns were ‘personalized’ or designed so that
only authorized users could fire them. To this end, manufacturers could
incorporate current technology—such as magnetic devices, radio
frequency transponders, and combination locks—into guns.”42 Regarding
youth suicides by gun, research indicates that suicide attempts correlate to
firearm access; suicidal teens without a gun readily available usually do
not simply find another means.43 For example, researchers have found that
nine out of ten suicide attempts by firearm are fatal, but all other (nonfirearm) suicide attempts are fatal only 8.5% of the time.44
Devices that prevent the unauthorized use of firearms could
potentially prevent criminal gangs and other unlawful possessors from
using them as trafficked or diverted weapons.45 A personalized smart gun
would be unusable when stolen, which over time could reduce the number
36. See Teret, supra note 9, at 25; see also Smart Guns, supra note 27.
37. See HEMENWAY, supra note 10, at 138 (“Some manufacturers are developing
‘smart’ or ‘personalized’ guns that cannot be fired except by authorized users. These guns
can help prevent unintentional injury to children and adolescents as well as the criminal
use of stolen guns (which will also reduce the likelihood of firearm theft).”).
38. Gun Violence Statistics, supra note 33.
39. Smart Guns, supra note 27.
40. See HEMENWAY, supra note 10, at 33 (“Most shootings of younger children
involve firearms belonging to parents and grandparents. Here, too, tragedies could be
prevented . . . .”).
41. See id. (“[C]hildren [are] finding improperly stored firearms and shooting
themselves or other people or adolescents shooting each other when they believe guns to
be unloaded – [Physicians] know that there are readily available technological solutions,
such as childproof firearms, smart guns, and magazine safeties.”).
42. Id.
43. See Teret, supra note 9, at 24 (“Some skeptics might suggest that the absence of
an operable gun would just cause a depressed teenager to find another means of suicide,
but research shows that substitution or displacement of means of suicide frequently does
not occur.”).
44. See Andrew Conner et al., Suicide Case-Fatality Rates in the United States, 2007
to 2014: A Nationwide Population-Based Study, 171 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. __ (Dec.
2019), available at https://bit.ly/3bMW921.
45. See Schroeder, supra note 3, at 82.

2020

SMART GUNS, THE LAW, AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT

701

of stolen guns on the black market.46 Fewer black market guns should
reduce the number of gun-related deaths and injuries that occur using
stolen weapons.47 Firearms stolen from homes and cars (numbering in the
hundreds of thousands per year) often go directly into the black market
and become crime guns.48 Personalized smart guns would be inoperable
by thieves or buyers on the black market, reducing the rate of gun crime
resulting in death.49
Legally, there are currently no federal regulations for firearm safety
or design standards, except for the National Firearms Act ban on machine
guns.50 In fact, a federal statute51 prohibits the Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC), the unit of government that normally regulates
safety for consumer items, from promulgating any rules or specifications
for firearms or ammunition. This means there are no laws in place that
incentivize gun manufacturers to develop or market smart guns. Three
states—Maryland,52 Massachusetts,53 and New Jersey54—have statutes
that address smart gun technology in some way, but none of these are
regulatory mandates.55 Some academic commentators have called for a
federal agency, whether a new bureau or a newly-authorized agency that
already exists, to have the authority to regulate firearm safety, including
making rules and giving grants to develop smart guns and foster their
widespread adoption by consumers.56 “The agency should have the funds

46. See id. at 138 (“These guns can help prevent unintentional injury to children and
adolescents as well as the criminal use of stolen guns (which will also reduce the likelihood
of firearm theft).”).
47. See David Hemenway, Reducing Firearm Violence, 46 CRIME & JUST. 201, 211–
12 (2017) (“Personalized guns (also known as smart guns) make it more difficult for
unauthorized people to use them. Having such guns rather than the normal firearm reduces
the likelihood of accidents, suicides, and thefts. Personalized guns for police would stop
criminals from seizing and using officers’ guns against them.”).
48. See id.; see also Michael L. Rich, Limits on the Perfect Preventive State, 46 CONN.
L. REV. 883, 890 (2014) (“The implementation of so-called ‘smart gun’ technologies,
which make a gun capable of being fired only by its lawful owner, could make it so that
many violent criminals would be unable to obtain a usable firearm.”).
49. See Hemenway, supra note 47, at 211–12.
50. See Smart Guns, supra note 27.
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1)(ii)(E) (2018).
52. See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5–132 (West 2020); Philip J. Cook et al.,
Gun Control After Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1054 (2009) (“And the Maryland legislature recently adopted a
pioneering requirement: All handguns manufactured after 2003 and sold in the state must
be ‘personalized’ with a built-in locking device that requires a key or combination to
release.”).
53. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131K (2019).
54. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:58-2.10, :58-2.7, :58-2.8, 2C:39-1dd (West 2020).
55. See Metzler, supra note 2, at 117–18 for a detailed commentary on the statutes in
these three states.
56. See HEMENWAY, supra note 10, at 212–27.
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to promote research on personalized or ‘smart guns’ and on less lethal
ammunition and weapons,”57 contends David Hemenway.
Personalized smart guns have two main types: (1) biometrics-based
trigger locks (fingerprint or palm-grip readers, mostly); and (2)
radiofrequency identification (“RFID”)-token trigger locks (which work
only when the shooter is wearing an electronically matched ring, key fob,
or pendant).58 These two lines of technology have advanced in other arenas
in the last two decades and have become commonplace, but they have not
caught on for guns, partly for market reasons and partly for legal-political
reasons. A third but far less common version of this technology uses a PIN
touchpad—the user types a three- or four-digit code into a keypad on the
handle to enable the gun. Smart guns are, predictably, more expensive than
their electronics-free counterparts.59 But this is mostly due to the lack of
scaling in production (i.e., mass production). The technologies “work” in
a general sense—personalized guns are available for purchase—but like
most technology, they are not foolproof.60 Biometric guns may not work
if the user wears gloves, as police often do,61 or if the user has dirty or
sweaty hands, or simply because the device is buggy that day. RFID
trigger locks may be unusable even by the owner if the paired token
(usually a pendant or ring) happens to be in another location, or even
another room.62 Both technologies present potential battery issues, and
both are susceptible to (malicious) overrides or workarounds. RFID guns
with longer range token capability could also be susceptible to
sophisticated hackers.63
57. Id. at 214.
58. See Crepelle, supra note 14, at 254.
59. See Schroeder, supra note 3, at 83 (“In reality, the net effect on trafficking and
unauthorized use depends on several factors, including the difficulty of circumventing or
otherwise defeating the ECSMs, the security of tokens and PIN codes for token-based
technologies, and the false positive rate of biometric technologies.”).
60. See Michael Recce, Using Computer Technology to Increase Gun Safety, in
PERSONALIZED FIREARMS AND ELECTRONIC SAFETY DEVICES: PERSPECTIVES 35, 37 (Small
Arms Survey 2013); see also Crepelle, supra note 14, at 255 (“The even bigger concern,
though, is the potential for the user recognition mechanism to fail and block the authorized
user from firing the weapon at the crucial moment. Displaying a gun is often enough to
stop an attacker, but threats are not always sufficient.”).
61. See Metzler, supra note 2, at 128 (“Federal officers are often in situations where
their fingerprint would be dirty or wet, and if this technology is implemented a firearm may
not work when it is needed most . . . then they jeopardize the safety of the people they are
meant to protect.”).
62. See Metzler, supra note 2, at 110:
In 2015, Mossberg, a leader in the market of firearms for home defense, released
an RFID shotgun that can only be fired if the gun owner is wearing a ring.
Mossberg says that his company, O.F. Mossberg & Sons, the oldest family
owned gun company in the United States, is vigorously integrating the RFID
technology under his authority in the name of safety for the gun owner.
63. See Yu-Ju Tu & Selwyn Piramuthu, On Addressing RFID/NFC-Based Relay
Attacks: An Overview, DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS, Feb. 2020, at 1.
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There are technological tradeoffs: biometric smart guns do not rely
on radio signals and tokens, thereby eliminating the risk of hacking and
misplacing the secondary token. But, at the same time, biometric readers
present other reliability issues.64 The reliability of fingerprint scanners
depends on “variables such as finger positioning, residue, gloves,
moisture, and battery failure.”65 One solution to this issue is the use of
dynamic grip recognition,66 rather than a fingerprint scanner. Dynamic
grip recognition would work with gloves and relies on less expensive
sensors, because it measures relative pressure at numerous points from the
person’s grip, rather than reading grooves on the surface of the skin (like
a fingerprint reader).
Battery life could see improvement with newer prototypes that use
the internal batteries only when the trigger is pulled.67 Growth in the
personalized electronics industry continues to reduce the cost and power
consumption associated with these small electronics.68 Some still express
concerns that a smart gun may nonetheless be left in its “locked” setting if
the battery fails, potentially leaving them defenseless in an emergency.69
In the long run, smart guns may need to have a design feature that makes
the gun default to a traditional, workable firearm whenever the electronics
fail.
Biometric sensors, such as fingerprint and palmprint scanners, are the
most common type of biometric ECSMs, but emerging technological
variations include grip, voice, facial recognition, and even skin
spectroscopy.70 Biometrics can be physical or behavioral. Physical
biometrics are some unique properties of the authorized user, such as their
“fingerprints, DNA, iris patterns, or facial features.”71 Alternatively,
behavioral biometrics are unique properties of an individual’s behavior,
like the characteristics of their voice or grip.
RFID, on the other hand, requires an external device for operation.72
The token or key in an RFID is often a wearable device containing tiny
64. See Schroeder, supra note 3, at 86 (“Concerns about the maturity and reliability
of new technologies also explain why some individuals and institutions are reluctant to
adopt them, particularly ECSMs. There are fears that adverse physical conditions, battery
failure, electromagnetic interference, or sabotage could render the devices inoperable
during an armed engagement.”); see also Hemenway, supra note 47, at 212.
65. 5 Things to Know About Smart Guns, POLICEONE (Aug. 3, 2017),
https://bit.ly/2UlIb1O.
66. See Crepelle, supra note 14, at 254.
67. See 5 Things to Know About Smart Guns, supra note 65.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See Schroeder, supra note 3, at 82.
71. Caitlin Hoffman, Survey: Most Gun Owners Support Sale of ‘Smart’ Guns But
Aren’t Likely to Buy Them, HUB (June 10, 2019) https://bit.ly/3aK3Kim.
72. See Schroeder, supra note 3, at 83 (“Token-based technologies differ from
biometric technologies in that the device that enables the weapon is contained in a separate
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electromagnetic transmitters, like a bracelet or ring, that emits a signal that
unlocks the gun.73 The token or key must be near the gun to unlock it.
RFID is already commonly in use for “allowing for controlled building
access, vehicle parking access, and library book theft prevention, among
many other uses.”74
LodeStar, a newer smart gun startup, chose to use RFID technology
instead of fingerprint readers, as it explains on its website: “RFID is a
proven, reliable approach and involves a simple “digital handshake”
across a narrow gap between a small digital chip worn by the owner (e.g.,
embedded in a ring or wristband) and another chip embedded in the
firearm.”75 LodeStar claims that smart guns could reduce gun deaths by
25%, that is, saving 100,000 lives per decade.76 Like other proponents, the
company contends that smart guns could reduce child gun accidents that
occur when children find and play with their parents’ guns, could prevent
teenagers from using parents’ guns in school shootings, would be unusable
as crime guns if stolen, and would reduce suicides by those who have
access to a friend or relative’s guns.77 Some earlier academic studies
suggest similar conclusions. One oft-cited article from the early 2000s
analyzed a sample of unintentional and undetermined firearm deaths and
concluded that 37% of these deaths would not have occurred if the
firearms involved had been smart guns.78 The simplicity of RFID devices
makes them overall less susceptible to user error. Nevertheless, the
authorized user would be responsible for two devices, the firearm and the
token. A gun owner may misplace the token, making it unavailable in an
emergency. Alternatively, a gun owner may be inclined to store the token
and the weapon together, rendering it “active” and negating the safety
benefits. Additionally, RFID devices are susceptible to electromagnetic
interference.

object, or token, which may or may not be personalized. Most token-based ECSMs employ
RFID technology, consisting of an RFID reader and tag.”).
73. See id. (“The reader is typically installed in the firearm and the tag is placed in
the token, which takes many forms, including rings, gloves, wristbands, and wrist
watches.”); see also Recce, supra note 60, at 38–39.
74. Teret, supra note 9, at 29.
75. See LODESTAR, https://bit.ly/3aImmiR (last visited May 19, 2020). LodeStar
claims its company “is by far the most ambitious developer of smart guns and is working
with German developers to have a 9mm RFID smart gun prototype available in the spring
of 2019 and available for marketplace availability later in 2020.” Id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See Jon S. Vernick et al., Unintentional and Undetermined Firearm Related
Deaths: A Preventable Death Analysis for Three Safety Devices, 9 INJURY PREV. 307, 308
(2003).
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A History of Missteps

Thorny legal and political issues have beset smart gun technology
since its inception.79 Smart guns saw an initial phase of interest,
investment, and then fizzled-out in the 1990s and early 2000s, and then
another wave of interest, investment, and fizzle-out after the horrific
elementary school massacre in Newtown, CT.80 The Clinton81 and
Obama82 Administrations each tried to encourage, or even force, the
development of smart guns—again, spurring initial interest that petered
out soon thereafter. In the Clinton years, the National Institutes of Justice
(with Congressional support) provided grants to some gun manufacturers
and the New Jersey Institute of Technology for research on smart gun
technology to prevent unauthorized use of police-issued handguns.83 By
the end of the 1990s, Colt Industries had completed the Z40, a new type
of pistol that included an RFID chip and worked with a matching
wristband.84 This development proved so controversial among gun-rights
advocates that Colt abandoned the project abruptly.85
Initial research into smart gun technology resulted from grants
offered by the U.S. government to gun manufacturers in the mid-1990s
and early 2000s.86 In May 2000, President Clinton announced a grant of
$300,000 to Smith & Wesson (“S&W”) to support research into smart gun
technologies and the development of smart gun prototypes.87 At the time,
79. See Steven P. Teret & Adam D. Mernit, Personalized Guns: Using Technology
to Save Lives, in REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: INFORMING POL’Y WITH EVIDENCE
AND ANALYSIS 174–81 (Daniel W. Webster & Jon S. Vernick eds., 2013).
80. See Smart Guns, supra note 27.
81. See James B. Jacobs, Zimring/Hawkins Citizen’s Guide to Gun Control: A
Retrospective, 23 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 75, 89 (2018) (“The Clinton Administration joined
the lawsuit and, in 2000, negotiated a settlement with Smith & Wesson, under which the
company promised . . . to invest in research on ‘smart-gun technology’ so that a gun could
only be fired by the persons to whom it had been programmed.”).
82. See Obama, supra note 14, at 857–58.
83. See Nancy Rodriguez, Strengthening Justice in the U.S.: The Impact of Scientific
Research, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 289, 299–300 (2016) (“NIJ is holding a Gun Safety
Technology Challenge to conduct an objective demonstration through testing and
evaluation of the reliability of firearms and firearm accessories available today that are
typically known by various terms such as smart guns, user-authorized handguns, childproof
guns, and personalized firearms.”).
84. See Lacey Nicole Wallace, American Preferences for “Smart” Guns Versus
Traditional Weapons: Results from a Nationwide Survey, 4 PREV. MED. REP. 11, 12 (2016).
The Colt Z40 is like the current Armatrix smart gun models. See id.
85. See Sophia Agathis, Private Equity’s Overleveraging of Portfolio Companies, 21
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 607, 629 (2016) (discussing Colt’s financial troubles and
relationships with investors in the wake of its smart gun debacle).
86. See SMALL ARMS SURVEY, PERSONALIZED FIREARMS AND ELECTRONIC SAFETY
DEVICES: PERSPECTIVES 1, 4 (2013).
87. See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Clinton Admin.
Reaches Historic Agreement with Smith and Wesson, (Mar. 17, 2000) (on file with author);
see also Daniel P. Rosner, In Guns We Entrust: Targeting Negligent Firearms Distribution,
11 DREXEL L. REV. 421, 439 (2018) (“With respect to manufacturing, Smith & Wesson
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S&W was being sued by various levels of the U.S. government for “not
taking adequate care in their distribution systems to keep guns out of the
hands of criminals . . . [and not] designing their guns as safely as was
feasible.”88 S&W accepted the grant and agreed to make changes to the
design of its guns to settle the lawsuits against it.89 Contemporaneously, in
the late 1990s, researchers at the Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and
Research published A Model Handgun Safety Standard Act (Model Act),90
which proposed a statutory mandate that licensed firearm dealers could
sell only personalized smart guns once such guns were available on the
retail market.91 Based on the Model Handgun Safety Standard Act, which
recommended that state governments establish performance standards for
all newly manufactured handguns,92 New Jersey enacted the New Jersey
Childproof Handgun Law.93 The law mandated that, three years after smart
guns were commercially available in the state, only smart guns could be
sold. This legislative action merely confirmed the fears of many gun-rights
groups that the availability of smart gun technology would result in state
and federal mandates prohibiting the manufacture, and eventually the
ownership, of traditional guns. Critics, such as the National Rifle
Association (“NRA”), argued that such legislation would effectively be a
handgun ban, which would implicate Second Amendment rights.94 Even
today, smart gun advocates consider the New Jersey bill “a debilitating
blow for the smart gun movement” because it virtually halted all
development in smart technology in the U.S.95 S&W was in the process of
developing a product to bring to market, and the New Jersey enactment
prompted the NRA to call for the boycott of S&W, and as a result, the
company temporarily closed two factories and ultimately laid off 125
agreed to implement safety features—such as child proof handguns, locking devices, and
chamber load indicators—that would mitigate the risk of accidental shootings. Other
measures included promises to invest resources into researching and developing smart gun
technology that would enhance firearm safety.”).
88. Teret, supra note 9, at 29–30.
89. See id.
90. See SUSAN DEFRANCESCO ET AL., A MODEL HANDGUN SAFETY STANDARD ACT
(2d ed. 1998). All the authors of the Model Act have a J.D. and an M.P.H. See id.
91. For pre-Heller unfavorable discussion of the proposed mandate, see generally
Cynthia Leonardatos et al., Smart Guns/Foolish Legislators: Finding the Right Public
Safety Laws, And Avoiding the Wrong Ones, 34 CONN. L. REV. 157 (2001) (criticizing
proposed mandate).
92. See Teret, supra note 9, at 28.
93. See Cody J. Jacobs, End the Popularity Contest: A Proposal for Second
Amendment “Type Of Weapon” Analysis, 83 TENN. L. REV. 231, 269 (2015) (“A more
ambitious law in New Jersey will require all handguns that are sold after a certain date to
be equipped with ‘smart gun’ or ‘owner authorization’ technology that allows the gun only
to be fired by its authorized owner, once such technology is available.”).
94. For legal commentary arguing along these lines, see Lujan, supra note 14, at 501–
10; see also Murphy Signs Bill Aimed at Making Smart Guns Available, U.S. NEWS (July
16, 2019), https://bit.ly/2UrOVeB; Charles, supra note 14, at 1176.
95. See Metzler, supra note 2, at 118.
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employees.96 The boycott was successful, financially crippling for S&W,
who abandoned the product. By the following year, Tompkins, the
company that bought S&W for $112 million 14 years prior, sold it for $15
million, plus debt absorption.97
Around the same time, smart guns appeared in a wave of reformistminded litigation against firearm manufacturers98—also trying to make
smart guns mandatory—but through tort liability-based duties rather than
through statute. Municipalities, states, nonprofit organizations, and some
individual plaintiffs brought (largely unsuccessful) public nuisance claims
against gun makers over the widespread violence that resulted from their
products. Many of these claims included an assertion that gun makers had
a duty to produce firearms with better safety features, i.e., smart guns.99
The attempt to mandate personalized smart guns through litigation proved
unsuccessful in case after case, but these cases were part of the larger
litigation trend that prompted Congress to enact a federal statute, the
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (“PLCAA”)100, shielding
gun manufacturers from liability in such cases—that is, providing
immunity to tort actions. The PLCAA blocked subsequent litigation
attempts to compel gun manufacturers to develop and market personalized
guns.101 However, a 2019 decision by the Indiana Court of Appeals may
96. See Roger Parloff, Smart Guns: They’re Ready. Are We?, FORTUNE (Apr. 22,
2015), https://bit.ly/2UnGTDA.
97. See id.
98. For an overview, see City Cases, BRADY UNITED (2019), https://bit.ly/3bz4sz6.
99. See, e.g., People v. Arcadia Machine & Tool, Inc., No. 4095, 2003 WL 21184117,
at *4 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2003) (“According to defendants, the gist of
plaintiffs’ design claims is that defendants have engaged in unfair business practices and
created a public nuisance by failing to incorporate certain design features into their
respective firearms—such as magazine disconnect safeties, chamber-loaded indicators, and
‘personalized gun’ or ‘unauthorized user’ technology, including integral locks. Defendants
submit that causation is also an essential element of these claims.”); NAACP v. A.A. Arms,
Inc., Nos. 99 CV 3999, 99 CV 7037, 2003 WL 2003788, at *1–*3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2003);
Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 792 A.2d 1145, 1148 (Md. 2002) (“Petitioner alleged
. . . personalized gun technology that would have substantially reduced the likelihood that
a child could fire the gun . . . .”); City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 12 Mass.L.Rptr.
225 (July 13, 2000) (“Plaintiffs [unsuccessfully] claim that failure to incorporate
‘personalized’ gun technology (to prevent unauthorized or prohibited persons from
obtaining access to and using guns) results in homicides and other crimes, some of which
occur in Boston . . . Defendants are in the best position to conduct research to correct the
design of their guns.”); Whitfield v. Heckler & Koch Co., No. EC023122, 1998 WL
1769748, at *19 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 1998) (“‘At this point in time, no
electronic “Smart Gun” technology has been demonstrated which would be effective
enough to be commercially viable.’”).
100. See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903
(2018).
101. See Adames v. Sheahan, 909 N.E.2d 742, 750–51 (Ill. 2009) (claim against
manufacturer was barred by Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act); see also Cody
J. Jacobs, The Second Amendment and Private Law, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 945, 986 (2017)
(discussing liability-based duties for firearm manufacturers to include smart gun safety
technology but conceding, “[t]he ability to bring suits under these kinds of theories has
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have revived one part of this litigation under an exception in the
PLCAA.102
A similar story unfolded again in the Obama years, in the wake of the
Newtown atrocity.103 A directive from President Obama led the
Departments of Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security in 2016 to issue
a report that concluded gun manufacturers need government financial
incentives or mandates to develop smart gun technology and bring it to
market.104 The Report proposed a plan to form partnerships between the
federal government and state and local law enforcement agencies to
“establish the specific conditions under which they would consider
purchasing firearms with advanced gun safety technology.”105 A few
months later, in November 2016, the Obama Administration published
baseline specifications for police service pistols, which included smart gun
personalization technology.106 One RFID smart gun, the Armatix iP1, was
briefly planned to be offered at stores in the U.S. but was ultimately
withdrawn in the wake of death threats and violent intimidation against
gun dealers by gun owners.107 Gun rights advocates feared its introduction
into the American market would trigger the New Jersey Childproof

been severely limited by the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act
(PLCAA), which immunizes gun manufacturers from suits relating to the ‘criminal or
unlawful misuse’ of their products.”).
102. See City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 126 N.E.3d 813, 823–34 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2019); see also Stephen D. Sugarman, Torts and Guns, 10 J. TORT L. 3, 6 n.15 (2017)
(explaining that a “design defect” claim based on the duty to incorporate smart gun
technology as a child safety feature would not fall under the PLCAA, but a claim for
criminal homicides that would not have occurred if the weapons were smart guns would
come under the statute).
103. See, e.g., Lujan, supra note 14, at 502.
104. See DEP’TS. OF DEF., JUSTICE, & HOMELAND SEC., Report to the President
Outlining a Strategy to Expedite Deployment of Gun Safety Technology (April 2016),
available at https://bit.ly/2wI9Qko [hereinafter Gun Safety Technology Report]; see also
Allen Rostron, A New State Ice Age for Gun Policy, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 327, 338
(2016) (“Suggesting that federal purchasing power could be a lever to encourage
development of new safety innovations, the Obama administration directed federal
agencies ‘to review the availability of smart gun technology on a regular basis’ and ‘to
consider whether including such technology in specifications for acquisition of firearms
would be consistent with operational needs.’”).
105. See Gun Safety Technology Report, supra note 104.
106. See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 250377, BASELINE
SPECIFICATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICE PISTOLS WITH SECURITY TECHNOLOGY
(2016).
107. See Michael S. Rosenwald, Maryland Dealer, Under Pressure from Gun-Rights
Activists, Drops Plan to Sell Smart Gun, WASH. POST (May 2, 2014),
https://wapo.st/2J7v3a7; see also Schroeder, supra note 3, at 87 (“Fire-arms retailers in
California and Maryland stopped selling the Armatix iP1 after receiving threats of physical
violence and store boycotts from gun rights advocates, who feared that sale of ECSMequipped handguns would lead to a ban on their conventional counterparts.”).
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Handgun Law.108 “In the ensuing uproar, [some] went so far as to threaten
stores that attempted to stock the IP1.”109
Soon thereafter, a hobbyist-hacker posted a video online showing that
the Armatix iP1 smart gun was easy to hack in three different ways, often
using technology that costs $20 or less.110 The hacker intercepted and
diverted the RFID control with a radio device, used the radio signal to jam
the RFID signal so the gun could not fire, and used inexpensive magnets
placed on the gun to override the RFID trigger lock, so the gun would fire
without it.111 The video was devastating for Armatix.
C.

Policy Objections and Consumer Reluctance

The NRA112 and other gun rights advocates113 question whether smart
guns would have any sort of meaningful effect on suicide, homicide, and
unintentional injuries. Some point out that smart guns would do little to
address adult suicide—the leading cause of firearm death.114 Others argue
that smart guns would do little to reduce the risk of accidental discharges
by children in homes for three reasons.115 First, research shows that the
gun owners who reported being likely to purchase a smart gun already
engaged in safe gun storage behaviors.116 Second, they contend that,
because most gun owners own multiple firearms, most households would
still have traditional firearms in addition to any newly purchased smart
gun. The presence of a smart gun, therefore, would not keep a child from

108. See Rosenwald, supra note 107; see also Charles, supra note 14, at 1176 (“Thus,
when Rockville, Maryland gun store owner Andy Raymond sought to become the nation’s
first smart gun dealer, gun rights activists responded fervently. Not only did gun rights
activists call for the boycott of Raymond’s gun store, but Raymond also received a number
of death threats . . . .”).
109. 5 Things to Know About Smart Guns, supra note 65. For more on the use of
threats and intimidation to dissuade firearm dealers from retailing smart guns, see Michael
S. Rosenwald, Threats Against Maryland Gun Dealer Raise Doubts about Future of Smart
Guns, WASH. POST (May 2, 2014), https://wapo.st/3dsx1Qx. See also Joseph Blocher, New
Approaches to Old Questions in Gun Scholarship, 50 TULSA L. REV. 477, 488 (2015) (“But
it does no favors to political engagement when, for example, a store that bars guns on its
premises, or even simply chooses to sell ‘smart guns,’ is denounced as violating the Second
Amendment.”).
110. See Andy Greenberg, Anybody Can Fire This ‘Locked’ Smart Gun With $15
Worth of Magnets, WIRED (July 24, 2017), https://bit.ly/3dqzFpC.
111. See id.
112. See “Smart” Guns and Mandatory Storage: Two Bad Policy Ideas Cut from the
Same Tattered Cloth, NRA: INST. FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION (July 27, 2019),
https://bit.ly/2vHADgg; see also A1F STAFF, The Truth About “Smart Guns”, NRA:
AMERICA’S 1ST FREEDOM (July 29, 2019), https://bit.ly/39ai2r2.
113. See, e.g., Mike McDaniel, Are Smart Guns Actually Smart?, TRUTH ABOUT
GUNS (Apr. 4, 2014), https://bit.ly/2WAtaL6.
114. See Hoffman, supra note 71.
115. See id.
116. See id.
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accessing one of the traditional guns.117 Finally, they point out that smart
guns would do nothing to curtail homicides committed by an individual
using their own gun. Even the Violence Policy Center (“VPC”), a gun
control advocacy group, has alternated between criticism, skepticism, and
agnosticism about smart guns118—partly because the VPC thinks that
smart guns might appeal to people who currently would not own a firearm
due to safety concerns, so that the overall number of guns in circulation
increases enough to offset any reduction in injuries from the safety
features.119 Proponents, however, answer that this would be true for any
safety or health device, but in the end it is better to have safer devices on
the market than unsafe devices, even if the devices become more common
in the process.120
Adverse selection effects among gun purchasers could cancel out the
anti-theft and anti-accident benefits of smart guns. The gun purchasers
most likely to have their guns stolen or misused by unsupervised children
are the least likely to buy personalized smart guns, and those at the least
risk of such outcomes are also the most likely to buy smart guns but receive
little additional benefit from the purchase.
Even if gun owners traded in their traditional handgun when
purchasing a smart gun, critics maintain that “the introduction of
personalized guns could greatly increase the lethality of the country’s
privately held gun stock” because newer firearms are “primarily highcapacity, higher caliber pistols with magazines with a capacity that can
range up to more than 30 rounds.”121 It is important to note, nonetheless,
that currently available models are associated with lower firepower.122 The
iP1, for instance, uses .22 rounds.123 For gun buyers focused on selfdefense, they may imagine dramatic life-or-death scenarios where they
draw the gun and fire fast enough to subdue a would-be assailant. For this
imagined scenario, each second counts because even a slight risk of
malfunction or delayed firing seems unacceptable, and low firepower is
unappealing. The limited product selection for consumers (gun
purchasers) is also a factor suppressing the adoption of personalized guns.

117. See VIOLENCE POL’Y CTR., supra note 35. According to the 2004 National
Firearms Survey, 48% percent of all individual gun owners and 41% of gun-owning
households reported owning four or more guns. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. Teret, supra note 9, at 24–25.
121. VIOLENCE POL’Y CTR., supra note 35. For a thorough discussion of lethality and
non-lethal alternatives in the Second Amendment context, see Blocher & Miller, Lethality,
supra note 21, at 294–300.
122. See 5 Things to Know About Smart Guns, supra note 65.
123. See id.
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Each company has one or two models available, and gun purchasers are
accustomed to an enormous range of options when buying.124
Personalization features could also reduce the expected resale value
of the gun, which in turn reduces the value or appeal of the gun to a
prospective purchaser. A used or preowned gun with a biometric trigger
lock would need resetting to remove the seller as a designated user and to
add the new buyer instead. Even though the smart gun manufacturers
claim this is an easy thing to do, it is still a transaction cost that we would
expect to affect resale prices. Moreover, the easier it is to reassign the
authorized user, the easier it is for thieves or children to gain access as
well. Compounding the potentially lower expected resale value of the gun
is the current elevated price that results from the lack of economies of scale
(not enough personalized smart guns are made and sold to capture
economies of mass production). As small arms analyst Matthew Schroeder
explains,
Cost may also limit sales of firearms equipped with ECSMs, including
to government agencies. The Armatix iP1 pistol and accompanying
wristwatch cost USD 1,798 - considerably more than most
conventional pistols on the market, including the models commonly
procured by security agencies. The unit cost for large orders of iP1
pistols would be lower than the retail price for individual units, but it
is unclear whether, and at what point, these economies of scale would
make ECSM-equipped firearms competitive with their conventional
counterparts in terms of price.125

Surveys indicate that if the safety features added $300 to the original
price, only 18% of gun owners reported being likely to purchase a smart
gun. Overall, 56% of respondents had concerns about the additional cost
associated with smart gun technology and 70% were concerned about the
technology working properly when needed.126
A more subtle price effect, impossible to quantify, is the reverse price
effects of the black market on the gray (mostly legal) secondary market.
Suppose that 10–15% of the guns that pass through the secondary (used
gun) market eventually end up in a sale to a prohibited person or a
permissible purchaser to commit crimes. If smart guns have zero market
value for those eventual purchasers, this limits the pool of prospective
future purchasers, and hence suppresses the expected resale value.
Following this series of last antecedents, the original retail purchaser, even
if she would never sell to anyone except a lawful purchaser who was also
a friend or relative, still has a lower expected resale price when purchasing
a gun from a licensed firearm dealer. The manufacturer’s suggested retail
124. See Schroeder, supra note 3, at 84–85.
125. Id.
126. See Hoffman, supra note 71.
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price may not account for this black-market after-effect, in which case the
guns will seem overpriced even for their novel features. In addition, note
that gun owners do not need to fear liability for what happens when their
guns are stolen, even if the owner negligently leaves the gun in a location
where it is easy prey for thieves.127
D.

The Unflagging Proponents

Everytown for Gun Safety128 (“Everytown”) has called on the major
firearms manufacturers to develop and market smart guns: “[S]afety
mechanisms built into the firearm itself can be more effective at preventing
unauthorized access to and unintentional discharge of firearms. Lost or
stolen guns could be easily located by their owners if firearms were
equipped with readily available technology.”129 Everytown proposes
several tech improvements: “authorized-use technology, like the thumb
scan or passcode available on many smartphones; loaded chamber
indicators that show when there is a cartridge in the chamber . . . and
tracking sensors to allow the authorized user to find the location of a
firearm, like the ‘find my phone’ feature . . . .”130
The Giffords Law Center also advocates for the adoption of smart
gun technology,131 noting that surveys suggest there would be a viable
market, and that some gun owners would prefer them, even if many object
to a ban on traditional firearms being part of the policy package.132 For
example, a 2019 survey study found that 79% of gun owners say that gun
stores should sell both traditional and personalized smart guns.133 In
another study, most of the survey respondents who are not currently gun
owners (~63% of this group) were willing to consider buying a
personalized smart gun if they were to buy a gun in the next year.134
Similarly, a study in 2016 found that:

127. See Andrew Jay McClurg, The Second Amendment Right to Be Negligent, 68
FLA. L. REV. 1, 24–31 (2016).
128. Everytown is an advocacy group, largely funded by tech-billionaire-turnedphilanthropist Michael Bloomberg, that has assimilated Moms Demand Action, Students
Demand Action, Mayors Against Illegal Guns, the Everytown Survivors Network,
Everytown Creative Council, and a litigation/lobbying unit. See EVERYTOWN FOR GUN
SAFETY, https://every.tw/3bodS0a (last visited May 19, 2020).
129. EVERYTOWN RESEARCH, EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY SUPPORT FUND, THE
TIME FOR TALK IS OVER: A CALL TO ACTION FOR GUN MANUFACTURERS (April 17, 2018)
at 7, available at https://every.tw/2JhbNHr.
130. See id.
131. See Smart Guns, supra note 27.
132. See id.
133. See Cassandra K. Crifasi et al., Desirability of Personalized Guns Among
Current Gun Owners, 57 AM. J. PREV. MED. 191, 193 (2019).
134. See Julia A. Wolfson et al., The US Public’s Preference for Safer Guns, 106 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 411, 412 (2016).
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[A]mong non-owners, older respondents and those with pro-gun
attitudes are less likely to prefer smart guns to traditional firearms.
Among gun owners, those with moderate political views, those with a
history of victimization, and those residing in the Northeast are all
more likely to prefer smart guns. Males and those with progun attitudes
are less likely to prefer smart guns. Education, income, race, marital
status, presence of children in the home, and comfort discussing gun
ownership with a doctor had no significant association with smart gun
preference.135

Researchers at Johns Hopkins never backed away from the proposed
statutory mandate they proposed in the late 1990s.136 As Stephen Teret
explained in 2013, the industry has no incentive to develop and market the
product, and consumer demand is not strong enough to force a change
through normal market pressures.137
Even though smart gun critics argue that legislation restricting the
sale of handguns to smart guns would effectively create an
unconstitutional handgun ban, advocates argue it is a reasonable
restriction, permissible under the Constitution.138 Whether such a mandate
would survive a Second Amendment challenge is a hotly contested
question in academic literature.139 The most plausible view was expressed
by Tyler J. Kimberly, in a 2014 law review article:
Even if smart guns impose some sort of “who” restriction, a federal
court would likely uphold the restriction. First, whatever burden a
court found likely would be minimal. In Chovan, the restriction was
within the scope of the Second Amendment because 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(9) placed a life ban on a class that historically had the right to
bear arms for self-defense . . . . Second Amendment rights have been
highly regarded and disputed, and the onset of new technology
associated with those rights will not be any different. Concerns
regarding smart-gun technology are understandable, but as this
Comment demonstrated, there is not yet a constitutional basis for
objecting to [a] smart-guns-only regime.140

Another category of supporters for personalized smart guns is private
funding providers. The leading example is the Smart Tech Challenges
Foundation,141 a grantmaking nonprofit that provides private funds for
smart gun startups whose product is in the development stage. The Smart

135. See Wallace, supra note 84, at 11, 14.
136. See Teret & Mernit, supra note 79, at 179–80.
137. See id.
138. See Metzler, supra note 2, at 124.
139. See Lujan, supra note 14; Godbold, supra note 14.
140. Kimberly, supra note 14, at 276–78.
141. See SMART TECH CHALLENGES FOUNDATION, https://bit.ly/2xUvJ00 (last visited
May 19, 2020).
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Tech Challenges Foundation launched in 2014 with the mission of
reducing gun violence through technological innovation.142 In its first year,
it granted $1 million to 15 innovator-entrepreneurs to develop products
ranging from RFID and biometric personalized smart guns to biometric
attachments for existing firearms (trigger locks, pistol holsters/holders,
and gun barrel locks).143 The grant recipients form a type of industry
community (the Foundation describes them as an “ecosystem”) that are
part competitors, part compatriots in a cause.144 Most have not brought
products to market yet, so they are not truly market rivals, though some
are working on similar technologies (slightly different versions of
biometric readers, for example) that could eventually compete, or are in a
race to complete product development. Biofire,145 Identilock,146 Vara
Safety,147 and Gun Guardian are all biometric safety devices (some are
guns with the feature built-in, others are attachments that would work with
existing pistols). These companies stand alongside more established
companies Armatix148 and iGun,149 which use RFID technology to
accomplish the same goal.
Personalized smart guns have enough political appeal that some
presidential candidates have included it in their campaign talking points or
policy agenda. For example, Joe Biden, when running for the 2020
Democratic Party nomination, took the position that “we should work to
eventually require that 100% of firearms sold in the U.S. are smart
guns.”150 Product requirements are common in most consumer items,
ranging from automobile airbags to lawnmowers. As already discussed,
gun enthusiasts view smart gun mandates as a ban on the sale of the
weapons that are currently popular (millions sold per year), meaning there
is considerable political opposition to a new-sales mandate (what Biden
calls a “requirement”). Constitutionally, under the Second Amendment,

142. See About Us, SMART TECH CHALLENGES FOUNDATION, https://bit.ly/34e0IR9
(last visited May 19, 2020).
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See BIOFIRE, https://bit.ly/2xUvEJK (last visited May 19, 2020).
146. See IDENTILOCK, https://bit.ly/34d4SbH (last visited May 19, 2020 ).
147. See VARA SAFETY, https://bit.ly/2X6ObNM (last visited May 19, 2020).
148. See Hemenway, supra note 47, at 212 (discussing the Armatix gun).
149. See IGUN TECHNOLOGY, https://bit.ly/2XcJKB8 (last visited May 19, 2020).
150. See The Biden Plan to End Our Gun Violence Epidemic, JOEBIDEN.COM,
https://bit.ly/39JjJvJ (last visited May 19, 2020). Biden’s campaign website adds, “Put
America on the path to ensuring that 100% of firearms sold in America are smart guns.
Today, we have the technology to allow only authorized users to fire a gun. For example,
existing smart gun technology requires a fingerprint match before use.” Id.; see also
Makena Kelly, Biden pushes smart guns as solution for gun violence during primary
debate, VERGE (June 27, 2019, 11:01 PM), https://bit.ly/2U8ZLG4 (“‘No gun should be
able to be sold unless your biometric measure could pull that trigger,’ Biden said.”).
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the viability of such a mandate is also a little uncertain.151 Up to now, the
Supreme Court has upheld bans on certain types of guns (machine guns
and short-barrel shotguns) under the National Firearms Act, and the
majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller emphasized, albeit in
dicta, that restrictions on certain types of firearms could remain in place.152
Circuit courts up to now have generally upheld state bans on
semiautomatic assault rifles and large-capacity magazines. But several of
these cases have pending certiorari petitions at the Supreme Court, and it
is not clear which way the Court would rule given the personnel changes
on the Court since Heller.153 If the existing stock of traditional (nonpersonalized) guns continued to be legal—including private sales of these
used guns—a requirement that new guns be a certain type would pose less
of a potential infringement on individual’s Second Amendment rights
than, say, an outright ban on all guns except smart guns, which is
politically unrealistic in any case. In addition, given the Court’s emphasis
in Heller on personal self-defense,154 the reliability of personalized smart
151. For an argument that smart gun requirements are “clearly” unconstitutional, see
Benjamin H. Weissman, Regulating the Militia Well: Evaluating Choices for State and
Municipal Regulators Post-Heller, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3481, 3515 (2014) (“Similarly, a
New Jersey statute that will restrict the sale of handguns without ‘smart gun’ technology
once that technology is commercially available should clearly fail under the common use
standard, as ordinary handguns are widely used, and explicitly protected under [Heller].”
(internal quotations omitted)).
152. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
153. The authors of both the majority and main dissenting opinions in Heller, Justices
Scalia and Stevens respectively, are no longer on the Court. Justices Kennedy and Souter
have also retired since Heller was decided. Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, and
Kavanaugh have joined the Court in the meantime; Justices Kagan and Sotomayor lean
toward more progressive policy positions, such as gun control, and Justice Sotomayor
joined Justice Breyer’s dissent in the follow-up case, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561
U.S. 742, 912 (2010). Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh each have a reputation for being
supportive of gun rights and the Heller decision, as indicated in their past opinions and
statements. See, e.g., Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 140
S.Ct. 789 (Mem) (2020) (Gorsuch, J. concurring) (regarding bump-stock ban litigation).
Kavanaugh indicated agreement with the Second Amendment portion of Justice Alito’s
dissent in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct.
1525 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J. dissenting). Gorsuch joined Thomas’s dissent in Peruta v.
California, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1999 (2017) (Thomas, J. dissenting). See also Heller v. Dist.
Of Columbia [Heller II], 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Although the additions of Gorsuch and Kavanaugh to the Court might portend stronger
support for pro-gun policy positions, the Court’s denial of certiorari in numerous Second
Amendment cases in the years since Heller and McDonald, most of which involved Circuit
Court decisions upholding gun restrictions, may indicate either that Justice Roberts has
moderated his position in the meantime or that the Court has decided to avoid the issue.
See Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1999 (2017) (Thomas, J. dissenting)
(complaining that the Court had not accepted a Second Amendment case in seven years);
Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the
Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1460 n.123 (2018) (“The
Supreme Court denied cert to more than sixty petitions in Second Amendment cases during
the study period.”).
154. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 599.

716

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 124:3

guns for self-defense, at the time such a requirement would go into effect,
would, in turn, be a factor in assessing the constitutionality of such a
mandate. At the same time, it would be a completely novel holding for a
court to constitutionally require some degree of reliability in unplanned
emergencies (self-defense), such as one hundred or even ninety percent.
Recent commentators note that currently, “smart gun manufacturers claim
smart guns have an expected failure rate of less than one in 10,000.”155
A separate constitutional question is whether a state or federal
government could limit the public carrying of firearms (whether open or
concealed) to personalized smart guns, even if traditional firearms
remained legal for home defense.156 Professor Timothy Zick recently
suggested this and avers that it would pass muster under certain
understandings of the Second Amendment.157
Military and police are often the trendsetters for adopting new styles
or types of firearms—gun makers advertise products to the civilian market
as the same guns used by the Army, Marines, or major urban police
departments. Adoption by the military and police would help foster
consumer appeal for smart guns. I believe that personalized gun
technology will not catch on until the military and police completely
switch over to it. This would be an easier policy move, from a legal
standpoint, than forcing the consumer market to switch first. Elected
officials have a lot of control over military and police equipment purchases
and upgrade policies. Here, however, is another problem: “the
conservative nature of military and law-enforcement agencies and the
historically slow pace of change in firearms technology.”158 As one
firearms industry insider put it, “‘[w]e are working in a field where there
has been little significant technological innovation in 120 years.’”159
Regarding product development and improvement, a recent working
paper published online by the National Bureau of Economic Research
demonstrates a significant “crowding-in” phenomenon for defense
spending on R&D—increases in government spending on R&D for a
specific industry or item result in significant corresponding R&D in the
private sector for the same industry or item.160 Each 10% increase in
defense spending on R&D generates at least a 4% increase (or more) in

155. See Crepelle, supra note 14, at 255.
156. See Blocher & Miller, Lethality, supra note 21, at 300–01 (mentioning smart
gun alternatives).
157. See Timothy Zick, Arming Public Protests, 104 IOWA L. REV. 223, 267 (2018).
158. See Schroeder, supra note 3, at 87.
159. See id.
160. See generally Enrico Moretti et al., The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense
R&D, Productivity and International Spillovers (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 26483, 2019), https://bit.ly/2yBCJiY (discussing the “crowding in” phenomenon
in this context).
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corresponding private sector R&D.161 But given the relative size of each
sector, this implies that a $1 increase in defense spending on R&D
generates a $5 increase in corresponding private-firm spending on
R&D.162 This is not merely due to an increase in wages for personnel in
that research sector, as a result of increased demand due to defense-sector
hiring.163 It is possible, of course, that some of this “crowding-in” is due
to private firms obtaining defense contracts and then subcontracting the
R&D for specialized components to other firms in the relevant industry.
Another factor could be that defense spending on a certain type of weapon
signals the firms in that sector that new contracts or Calls for Proposals
(CFPs) for research or production will be forthcoming. Moreover, if one
firm—say, an arms manufacturer—secures a defense contract for R&D,
rival firms in the industry may commence a race to secure patents in the
area. Of course, a government/military CFP or bidding competition for an
R&D contract can mean that several rival firms simultaneously develop a
proof-of-concept model for their bid, and even after the military awards
the contract to one firm, the others may decide to continue developing their
own product for the civilian market, given their existing investment in the
technology. In any case, “government-funded R&D in general - and
defense R&D in particular - are effective at raising a country’s total
expenditures on innovation in a given industry.”164 As a policy matter,
spending on military R&D will probably be the most effective means to
perfect the technology for personalized smart guns.
Another factor that might spur the adoption of personalized gun
technology includes repackaging it as an accessory attachment for existing
firearms, rather than manufacturing and selling a special type of gun. This
is the approach of Kodiak Arms with its Intelligun,165 which makes a $400
fingerprint-reader handgrip replacement for the super-popular 1911-style
semiautomatic pistol.166 There are millions of 1911 pistols in circulation,
it was a longtime favorite of law enforcement and military service
weapons in the twentieth century. More than one hundred manufacturers
produce, or have produced, a version of this handgun. A smart gun
conversion kit, like Intelligun, helps address the persistent problem (for
smart gun advocates) of the existing stock of firearms in private hands.
This kit also simultaneously helps address concerns by gun enthusiasts that
smart guns will not work as a traditional firearm if the electronics fail, as

161. See id. at 27.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 28.
164. Id. at 36.
165. See Nicole Nguyen, Here’s What’s Up With “Smart Guns”—And Why You
Can’t Buy One in the US, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 9, 2018, 5:06 PM),
https://bit.ly/2UIoMIE.
166. See id.
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an owner could simply remove the grip attachment from her 1911 and
restore it to its original state as a traditional handgun.167 In theory, this
approach could potentially become much more popular. On the other hand,
Intelligun includes an internal tracking/recording feature, discussed more
below, that records the pinpoint GPS location, time of discharge, and other
data every time the gun fires. Police unions have voiced opposition to
Intelligun technology for their service weapons because of the heightened
scrutiny or accountability it would provide after police shootings (similar
to bodycams, but even more precise).168
III.

GUNS THAT CANNOT MISS (SEMI-AUTONOMOUS OR
PRECISION-GUIDED FIREARMS)

If the desire for gun safety or gun control has been driving the
development of personalized smart gun technology, the desire for more
lethality—a guaranteed kill—are driving the development of a different
type of smart gun technology, precision-guided firearms that enable even
a novice gun owner to shoot like a professional marksman or expert sniper.
The military has developed and ordered sophisticated AWS for years,
starting with the big guns on ships, tanks, and fighter jets.169 In recent
years, small arms that incorporate this technology have appeared on the
civilian market as well. TrackingPoint sells guns that do not miss.170 These
guns can lock on a moving target, even in the dark, and hit it in the center
of its mass. They can correct for wind, humidity, angle, spindrift, rifle cant,
and the weight of the bullet. TrackingPoint’s most expensive models will
lock on a target and hit it from 1400 yards. If the marketplace tells us
anything, it is that gun purchasers are less interested in safety than in
lethality, which is not terribly surprising. Of course, such weapons are
especially appealing for military use,171 but they are already available for
167. See MINITER, supra note 3, at 230–32 (providing a lengthy description of
Kodiak’s Intelligun and its appeal).
168. See id. at 232.
169. See Frank Miniter, TrackingPoint Outranged by Military Technology,
RANGE365 (June 1, 2015), https://bit.ly/3bRvEJf (describing Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) military technology development in recent decades for smart
guns and smart bullets).
170. See TRACKINGPOINT, https://bit.ly/3bR7yOW (last visited May 19, 2020); see
also Justin Peters, The TrackingPoint “Smart Rifle” Exemplifies Everything That’s
Horrible About American Gun Culture, SLATE (June 5, 2013), https://bit.ly/3dzDwRu;
Gillian Tett, ‘Smart’ Guns and the Dangers of Trigger-Happy Technology, FIN. TIMES
(April 3, 2019), https://on.ft.com/3dxZyE1 (explaining concerns about the guns falling into
“malicious hands”); Dewey, supra note 16; Gassaway, supra note 17 (describing tour of
TrackingPoint’s facility, and the company’s history and plans); MINITER, supra note 3, at
48–53 (describing the TrackingPoint guns and the experience of firing one); Toscano,
supra note 18, at 232.
171. See MINITER, supra note 3, at 49–52 (comparing the military’s DARPA
initiatives with smart guns and bullets with the civilian-model TrackingPoint gun). See also
Suciu, supra note 20 (describing 2019 military orders for precision-guided small arms).
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the retail civilian market, though outside the price range of most gun
purchasers.172 The legal issues presented by this technology partly overlap
with those that surround personalized smart guns, but some distinct legal
concerns also apply to partly autonomous guns that have extreme
accuracy. The newness, high price, and (so far) scarcity of these weapons
means they have received less attention in the legal academic literature up
to now.
The TrackingPoint rifle employs a laser rangefinder to measure the
distance to the target and onboard electronics to measure incline/decline,
air temperature, air density, barometric pressure, and target movement.173
It also accounts for spindrift,174 the shooter’s cant,175 Magnus effect,176 and
the Coriolis effect,177 caused by the Earth’s rotation. The rifle scope’s
internal electronics already store data on the rifle’s own characteristics that
172. The least expensive TrackingPoint rifles start at just under $7000, while a Glock
17, one of the most popular handguns, sells for around $500, depending on its condition.
See TRACKINGPOINT, supra note 170, for current prices on their precision-guided rifles; for
current prices on Glocks, see GLOCKSTORE, https://www.glockstore.com (last visited May
20, 2020).
173. See MINITER, supra note 3, at 48.
174. As the manufacturer explains,
Spin drift is a deflection generated by the gyroscopic motion of the bullet. The
direction of the deflection is toward the direction of the spin, and the amount of
deflection is dependent on bullet length, flight time and, not surprisingly, spin
rate. Its effect is noticeable, and must be taken into account, starting around
500yds. The metrics of spin drift vary widely, therefore it’s hard to account for
the exact effect of spin drift on a bullet at extended ranges when shooting. It’s
an environmental hazard that only the most talented pros know how to
compensate.
Spin Drift, TRACKINGPOINT, https://bit.ly/3bLqQ81q (last visited May 19, 2020).
175. Cant refers to the shooter’s unconscious propensity to tilt a gun at a slight angle
or to pitch to one side:
It is most commonly used to describe a situation where the shooter is positioned
on a slope and the rifle is not held vertically true or straight up and down. In
other words, if you look through the riflescope, the horizontal crosswire is not
level. Cant is not to be confused with line-of-sight (LOS), such as when you are
shooting up or downhill. There are three types of cant rifle shooters must deal
with: rifle cant, scope cant and reticle cant.
Rifle Cant, TRACKINGPOINT, https://bit.ly/3bNb5h8 (last visited May 19, 2020).
176. Magnus effect or “spin drift” comes into play because a bullet leaves the barrel
of a gun twirling rapidly as it hurtles forward, and air flow interacts with the spin to nudge
the trajectory off course:
The Magnus effect is an observable phenomenon that is commonly associated
with a spinning object that drags air faster around one side, creating a difference
in pressure that moves it in the direction of the lower-pressure side. When
shooting long range, the shooter must account for the distance the bullet will drift
due to wind. All other things being equal, the bullet will hit a different place if
the wind is coming 90 degrees from the left versus 90 degrees to the right.
Magnus Effect, TRACKINGPOINT, https://bit.ly/2XbZdRG (last visited May 19, 2020).
177. Coriolis effect “refers to the deflection on the trajectory of the bullet generated
by the spinning motion of the Earth.” Coriolis Effect, TRACKINGPOINT,
https://bit.ly/3bR9qXY (last visited May 19, 2020). At long distances, (1000 yards or
more), it can affect the bullet on the horizontal and vertical planes of its trajectory. See id.

720

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 124:3

affect the bullet’s flight pattern, such as the ballistic coefficient, muzzle
velocity, lock time, ignition time, and the direction of the barrel-rifling
twist.178 The shooter pulls the trigger, but the rifle (or more properly, the
smart scope) chooses the exact timing of the discharge to guarantee a hit
in the center mass of the target.179 This weapon mostly eliminates operator
error; allowing an inexperienced shooter to hit small targets ten football
fields away.180 At the same time, the TrackingPoint rifle is not fully
autonomous—it does not shoot unless someone pulls the trigger and
initiates the sequence of instantaneous calculations and precision firing.181
In military contexts, soldiers in the heat of battle could take out moving
targets very quickly without perfectly maintaining the target in their
sight.182
TrackingPoint has a built-in Wi-Fi transmitter that streams live video
and audio to a networked device, such as a smartphone or laptop.183
Shooters can easily record shots and post the videos online, or they can
live stream their shoots to social media sites.184 I will return to this
technology later, when discussing recordkeeping guns, but for now, it is
worth noting that a video live stream from a sniper rifle presents special
advantages in military and law enforcement contexts, where an offsite
command center could monitor everything and call the shots.185 Of course,
there are nefarious uses for live streaming as well, as when terrorists or
rampage shooters want to broadcast their atrocities to garner attention or
notoriety.
It is easy to imagine military and law enforcement uses for
precision-guided firearms.186 But TrackingPoint’s market now includes
“safari enthusiasts, the outdoorsmen . . . even ranchers, folks that don’t
have all day to run the fence line but need to take care of their predator
population.”187 Of course, some hunters have been critical of the concept,
arguing that it resembles the proverbial shooting fish in a barrel.188 It also

178. See MINITER, supra note 3, at 49.
179. See Dewey, supra note 16.
180. See MINITER, supra note 3, at 49.
181. See id. at 50.
182. See id. at 223.
183. See Dewey, supra note 16.
184. See id.; see also MINITER, supra note 3, at 223–34.
185. See Toscano, supra note 18, at 232.
186. See Daniel Trotta, Gun with a Chip: U.S. Army Contracts May Lead to a Smarter
Firearm, REUTERS (Oct. 18, 2019, 6:33 AM), https://reut.rs/33Rrpe5.
187. See Gassaway, supra note 17 (quoting Nelson Whiting, Vice President of
Manufacturing at TrackingPoint).
188. See Dewey, supra note 16 (“It’s the traditional shooting fish in a barrel or the
sitting duck. I mean, there’s no skill in it, right? It’s just you point, you let the weapon
system do its thing and you pull the trigger and now you’ve killed a deer. There’s no skill,”
according to hunter Chris Wilbratte.); Peters, supra note 169 (“Any self-respecting hunter
ought to be disgusted by something that promises to turn every hunt into a canned hunt.
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seems to defeat the purpose of target practice, for those who enjoy that.
For better or worse, however, leading gun experts say this is the future of
firearms, or “where we’re going.”189 The manufacturer plans to repackage
the technology as a scope that could attach to any firearm,190 so the
millions of guns—any rifle or handgun large enough to hold a scope—that
are already in private hands could become a precision-guided firearm. The
greatest significance of these market disrupting new firearm technologies
is working with the existing stock of traditional firearms, upgrading older
guns into next-gen sophisticated firearms, and having the new high-tech
guns also work as a traditional firearm if the electronics break or fail.
The military wants guns like this but even better—they want the
option to override the weapon from the command center if it were being
misused, and operate the gun almost like a drone, or at least see exactly
what the soldier is seeing through the scope.191 It would be useful for the
military to be able to deactivate guns from a remote location if the soldier
carrying it dies on the battlefield, or to have the ability to reassign the gun
to another soldier in the same unit. In addition, when our troops withdrew
recently and very abruptly from Syria, our military did not have time to
pack up all their munitions, so they destroyed entire garages full of
weapons lest ISIS seize them as soon as our forces withdrew.192 That
happens more than most people think—battalions have to withdraw,
retreat, or even charge forward and leave things behind and the Pentagon
wants to be able to deactivate all the weapons until our forces (or allies)
retrieve them.193
One common theme in the legal issues surrounding these
technologies is the internal turmoil, financial troubles, and resulting
litigation that these companies face (though firm-level volatility may be a
Despite the manufacturer’s claims, TrackingPoint really isn’t suited for target shooting—
where’s the fun in shooting at a target that you know you’re going to hit?”).
189. See MINITER, supra note 3, at 221.
190. See Gassaway, supra note 17 (“It will come in the package set to work. You just
put it on your gun, zero it the same as you normally would zero any gun and it will do
much of the rest, but with your own gun, you will not have trigger control.”) (quoting a
TrackingPoint executive).
191. See Daniel Trotta, Gun with a Chip: U.S. Army Contracts May Lead to a Smarter
Firearm, REUTERS (Oct. 18, 2019, 6:33 AM), https://reut.rs/33Rrpe5; Suciu, supra note 20.
192. See Suciu, supra note 20 (“Depending on how the technologies were
implemented, it might also lessen or eliminate the need to destroy facilities that were being
abandoned – as recently occurred when U.S. soldiers withdrew from bases in Syria.
Similarly, smart tech could reduce or eliminate the value of stolen military weapons.”). In
addition, smart technology could alleviate legal implications of U.S. provided weapons
being used against unintended targets, by providing military forces the ability to “disarm”
weapons provided to resistance fighters, like the SDF in Syria. See Ellen Francis & Tom
Perry, Syrian Kurds Outgunned but Vow to Inflict Toll on Turkish Army, REUTERS (Oct. 9,
2019, 7:03 PM), https://reut.rs/3arZ80f.
193. See, e.g., Pierre Bienaimé, How ‘Smart Guns’ Could Eventually Help Shape US
Foreign Policy, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 7, 2015, 11:54 AM), https://bit.ly/2xz2lMF.
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feature endemic to the firearms industry generally)194 at least in the United
States. The discussion above,195 pertaining to personalized smart guns,
mentioned the attendant financial problems, bankruptcy, and consumer
boycotts for Colt and S&W, including the litigation between one of the
lead inventors of the technology and the manufacturer. TrackingPoint had
its share of troubles along these lines. After launching its product line in
2013, TrackingPoint sold more than 1,000 of its expensive rifles within
the first two years. But by 2015, the company was in trouble, and at one
point laid off most of its employees and temporarily stopped taking
orders.196 The company fired two of its high-profile executives, who
promptly went to a competitor company and brought TrackingPoint’s
innovative technology with them, which in turn resulted in litigation.197 In
late 2018, Talon Precision Optics acquired TrackingPoint and took over
its product line.198 Even so, TrackingPoint is currently selling its guns
(with an expanded product line), introduced more affordable prices, and is
obtaining new patents.199 News items and reviews from 2013 to 2015
describe the price as being $25,000,200 but the prices have come down to
feature an AR-15 model for around $7,000 on the company website—still
pricey, but not too far afield from what other high-end assault rifles cost.201
TrackingPoint even experienced an embarrassing hacker video,202 not
unlike what happened to the Armatix RFID personalized gun—hackers
194. See, e.g., Jesse Barron, How America’s Oldest Gun Maker Went Bankrupt: A
Financial Engineering Mystery, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (May 1, 2019),
https://nyti.ms/39l4JnC. Ironically, around the time Remington was going bankrupt,
TrackingPoint had been counting on them either to acquire their company or pay a lucrative
license for their technology. See id.
195. See supra notes 83–97 and accompanying text.
196. Colin Lecher, Under the Gun: How the Perfect Rifle Missed Its Target, VERGE
(June 11, 2015, 11:25 AM), https://bit.ly/2WME7t7 (describing internal turmoil at the
company in 2015, disgruntled employees, and dire financials).
197. See generally TrackingPoint, Inc. v. Silencerco LLC, No. D-1-GN-15-004646,
2015 WL 5968265 (Dist. Ct. Tex. October 13, 2015) (Trial Pleading).
198. See Press Release, Talon Precision Optics, Talon Precision Optics, LLC
Announces Asset Purchase in Precision-Guided Firearms and Advanced Optics
Technologies (Dec. 21, 2018), https://prn.to/3bvjfL6.
199. See, e.g., U.S. Patent Appl. Publ No. 2019/0243230 A1 (filed Aug. 20, 2018);
U.S. Patent No. 10,337,830 B2 (filed Dec. 31, 2012).
200. See, e.g., Toscano, supra note 18, at 232.
201. See, e.g., Jared Keller, The Marine Corps’ New Rifle Is Super Expensive — And
No One Knows Why, TASK & PURPOSE (Mar. 21, 2018, 11:49 AM), https://bit.ly/2WJSChi.
202. See Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, The Internet of Heirlooms and
Disposable Things, 17 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 581, 592 (2016) (including the rifles in a list of
Internet-connected devices that are vulnerable to hackers); Andy Greenberg & Kim Zetter,
How the Internet of Things Got Hacked, WIRED (Dec. 28, 2015, 7:00 AM),
https://bit.ly/33LWobu (describing how certain hackers demonstrated to journalists that
they could “control of a Wi-Fi-enabled TrackingPoint sniper rifle. Sandvik and Auger
exploited the rifle’s insecure Wi-Fi to change variables in the gun’s self-aiming scope
system, allowing them to disable the rifle, make it miss its target, or even make it hit a
target of their choosing instead of the intended one.”); Andy Greenberg, Hackers Can
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hijacked the electronics and manipulated the gun to hit the target to the left
or right of the intended target. This proved less devastating for the
company than the Armatix debacle—perhaps because the hackers in the
video are well-known, elite hacker-researchers who give presentations at
major tech conferences. It is not clear whether most hackers have the
requisite expertise to do this, or that they would have the opportunity to be
near one of these long-range safari-style guns when it is actually in use.
As frightening as these weapons may seem to gun control
advocates,203 as of yet there are no reported instances of TrackingPoint
guns being used in crimes or shooting rampages. Despite the price drop,
these rifles are still more expensive than most other guns—out of the price
range for many adolescent gang members in poor neighborhoods and an
unnecessary expense even for any criminal or terrorist organizations who
could afford them. Additionally, the guns are enormous, not a convenient
or useful tool for a close-encounter street robbery (especially if the
perpetrator is on foot), or as a carry-along for a burglary. Sniper rifles in
general are uncommon in homicides and interpersonal assaults—not a big
contributor to crime rates overall or rates of shooting deaths specifically.
Oversized, expensive, precision-guided hunting/sniper rifles are also an
unlikely choice for impulsive homicides, such as domestic violence or
suicide. Of course, if the predictions of experts come to fulfillment, this
technology will become miniaturized, affordable, and attachable to any
existing firearm, so the current natural limitations of size and price will
erode over time. Moreover, the guns present some issues for certain types
of crimes that can be very disruptive or destabilizing to society. Such
disruptions include assassinations, whether sniper attacks on important
public figures, or the drive-by shootings and targeted “hits” that are part
of gang activity or street crime. Although less common than other types of
homicides and assaults, assassinations can pose a special threat to
democracy and culture—not only killings of elected officials, but leaders
of social movements, important religious figures, and philanthropists.
Similarly, there are unquantifiable economic ripple effects when violent
attacks remove major financiers, technology innovators, or business
leaders. Drive-by shootings in poor neighborhoods have a chilling effect
on life in the public sphere, which can choke communities. Weapons
optimized for targeted killings—of moving objects or from moving
vehicles, from significant distances—pose special challenges for ensuring
safety and security. They may thwart traditional security measures.
Disable a Sniper Rifle—Or Change Its Target, WIRED (July 29, 2015, 7:00 AM),
https://bit.ly/2Uz6cBq (“the researchers were able to dial in their changes to the scope’s
targeting system so precisely that they could cause a bullet to hit a bullseye of the hacker’s
choosing rather than the one chosen by the shooter.”).
203. See MINITER, supra note 3, at 51; Tett, supra note 169 (expressing concerns that
these weapons will fall into criminals’ hands).
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Heightened lethality can have a ratchet effect—whatever level of
lethality some “criminals” have in their weaponry, law enforcement and
civilians wanting to stop criminals will demand the same firepower or
lethal technology.204 If members of criminal enterprises expect to
encounter certain types of armed resistance, they in turn are more likely to
bring weapons to match it with equal force. An arms race is an inherent,
unavoidable feature of any firearm technology that raises lethality.
Banning precision-guided firearms is permissible under courts’ current
Second Amendment analysis. The Heller decision left in place
longstanding federal restrictions on machine guns and short-barrel rifles,
and though nothing is certain with regards to the future of Second
Amendment jurisprudence, a state or federal ban on Guns That Cannot
Miss should fit into this constitutional niche. On the other hand, homicides
with these weapons are likely to remain so rare for the near future, at least
in comparison to other shootings, that there is unlikely to be voter demand
for legislation tailored to these guns.
The majority opinion in Heller repeatedly references the Second
Amendment as a safeguard against government tyranny205—that is, an
armed citizenry can resort to a violent revolt and overthrow an overbearing
government. This is a favorite talking point for the NRA206 and Gun
Owners of America207—that democratic freedoms and civil liberties
depend on a fearsomely-armed private citizenry, and conversely, that gun
control is historically a precursor to disarming the citizens to establish a
dictatorship.208 I find these arguments disturbing—history seems instead
to demonstrate that the most oppressive, bloodthirsty, genocidal regimes
are those that take power by overthrowing the established government,
even though they invariably claim to be liberators at the outset.209
Nevertheless, the safeguard-against-tyranny point has traction in Second
204. See Blocher & Miller, Lethality, supra note 21, at 289–90.
205. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 598 (2008) (“Third, when the
able-bodied men of a nation are trained in arms and organized, they are better able to resist
tyranny.”); see id. at 600 (noting the need to “safeguard against tyranny”); see id. at 613
(reiterating the “purpose of banding together to oppose tyranny”); see id. at 668 (“extolling
the virtues of the militia as a bulwark against tyranny”).
206. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Rifle Ass’n—Inst. for Legislative Action, NRA
Slams Bernie Sanders’ Tyrannical Assault on American Gun Rights (Mar. 21, 2019),
https://bit.ly/2yce4Bm; Press Release, Nat’l Rifle Ass’n—Inst. for Legislative Action, 65%
See Gun Rights as Protection Against Tyranny (Jan. 18, 2013), https://bit.ly/2WHZ88l.
207. See, e.g., Kurt Hofmann, ‘Gun Control’: The ‘Gateway Tyranny’, GUN OWNERS
OF AM. (May 27, 2013), https://bit.ly/2QP0eeD.
208. See, e.g., Robert Tracinski, How the Second Amendment Prevents Tyranny,
FEDERALIST (Mar. 18, 2018), https://bit.ly/2WNGtrQ.
209. See Casey Michel, The Myth That Civilian Gun Ownership Prevents Tyranny:
Do High Rates of Gun Ownership Protect Democracies? Data Points to a Resounding No,
THINK PROGRESS (Apr. 30, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://bit.ly/2JiKiNv; Mark Nuckols, Why the
‘Citizen Militia’ Theory Is the Worst Pro-Gun Argument Ever, ATLANTIC (Jan. 31, 2013),
https://bit.ly/3by6sav.
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Amendment jurisprudence210 and scholarship.211 To that extent, weapons
optimized for assassinations are optimized for the Second Amendment’s
purported goal, and should receive special legal protection and
encouragement, rather than legal restrictions. For me, specialized
assassination guns simply highlight the perverseness of the anti-tyranny
argument.
On a more mundane level, these next-generation weapons with superlethality could force our criminal justice system to revisit long-held
assumptions about the proper line between intentional and unintentional
homicides. Would it furnish an affirmative defense, or at least a mitigating
factor in the gradation of charges or sentences, if the weapon used is one
that assists in completing the shot in the last instant when a regular shooter
might hesitate or reconsider? Conversely, if a shooter uses a gun that
guarantees death, does this create a legitimate inference (thinking in terms
of jury instructions) of more or clearer premeditation and deliberateness,
and therefore more culpability? The question is whether a semiautonomous weapon undermines, or intensifies, the scienter element of the
crime.
A similar conundrum may arise when judges and juries assess
attempted versus completed crimes. When is the crime complete with
these guns? When the shooter tags the target and pulls the trigger, or a few
seconds later when the gun decides to discharge the round? If “attempt”
cases turn on what constitutes enough steps in preparation, furtherance,
and execution, does buying a guarantee-kill sniper rifle count as more
steps toward completion than a regular gun? Can new technology function
as skipping steps in executing a plan?
Precision-guided firearms also raise new questions about the right of
self-defense. A specialized weapon guaranteed to kill its target might
move an incident along a continuum away from a spontaneous reaction to
danger and closer toward a preplanned killing that is merely waiting for
an opportunity, that is, waiting for the other party to provide an imminent
210. See, e.g., Teixeira v. Cty. of Alameda, 873 F.3d 670, 686 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Early
American legislators and commentators understood the Second Amendment and its state
predecessors as protecting Americans against tyranny and oppression.”); Tyler v. Hillsdale
Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 707 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Less obvious to the contemporary
judicial mind are the Founding-era fears of tyranny and defenselessness that provided the
impetus behind the Second Amendment.”); Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1196–98
(2003) (discussing anti-tyranny purpose of Second Amendment).
211. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second
Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 426–28 (2009); Stephanie Cooper Blum,
Drying Up the Slippery Slope: A New Approach to the Second Amendment, 67 BUFF. L.
REV. 961, 967 (2019); Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Revolt of the Masses: Armed Civilians and
the Insurrectionary Theory of the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 643 (1995);
Darrell A. H. Miller, Institutions and the Second Amendment, 66 DUKE L. J. 69, 77 (2016);
Douglas Walker, Jr., Necessary to the Security of Free States: The Second Amendment as
the Auxiliary Right of Federalism, 56 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 365, 369–70 (2016).
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threat as an excuse.212 Joseph Blocher has observed that the laws regarding
preparations for self-defense, embodied in the loose or discretionary “good
cause” requirements in some states for a concealed carry permit, are less
exacting than those required ex-post for justifying the use of lethal force
in self-defense.213 Arming oneself (in private or public) as a preparatory
measure for self-defense would generally have no requirement of an
imminent threat or proportional force (both of which are difficult to
foresee), but one could argue that a precision-guided firearm is at the
maximum or outer bounds of proportional force for self-defense.
Traditional self-defense jurisprudence also included a consideration of
proportionality,214 but these guns raise a novel question about whether
certainty of success is part of the proportionality question.215 Suppose, for
example, that the force (say, the caliber of weapon) is an equal match,216
212. See Joseph Blocher, Good Cause Requirements for Carrying Guns in Public,
127 HARV. L. REV FOR. 218, 221 (2014) (“Self-defense law is about ex post risk
assessment, in the sense that the event has already happened, and the law seeks to determine
whether the self-defender’s actions were reasonable and proportional to the threat Good
cause requirements do the same thing from an ex ante perspective . . . .”).
213. See id. Laying a lethal trap for an anticipated assailant—such as a spring gun or
a spike-bottomed pit—is not legitimate self-defense, see Toomer v. William C. Smith &
Co., Inc., 112 A.3d 324, 326 (D.C.App. March 26, 2015); Sydnor v. State, 776 A.2d 669,
677 (Md.App. July 20, 2001); J. D. Perovich, Use of Set Gun, Trap, or Similar Device on
Defendant’s Own Property, 47 A.L.R.3d 646 (1973). On the other hand, shooting an
assailant normally is. See Eric Ruben, An Unstable Core: Self-Defense and the Second
Amendment, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 85 (2020); Fritz Allhoff, Self-Defense Without
Imminence, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1527, 1527-29 (2019). I am arguing that precisionguided firearms fall somewhere on the boundary between these two.
214. See, e.g., Richard J. Arneson, Self-Defense and Culpability: Fault Forfeits First,
55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 231, 258–59 (2018); Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, The
Second Amendment As Positive Law, 13 CHARLESTON L. REV. 103, 110–11 (2018); Lisa
Hecht, Provocateurs and Their Rights to Self-Defence, 13 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 165, 169 (2019)
(“In ordinary self-defence cases, proportionality is a constraint on the permissible use of
force and the forfeiture of defensive rights.”); Addie C. Rolnick, Defending White Space,
40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1639, 1659 (2019) (“These four elements—imminence of threat,
necessity, proportionality, and reasonableness—form the legal bounds of traditional selfdefense doctrine.”); see also Commonwealth v. Abubardar, 120 N.E.3d 1228, 1230 (Mass.
2019) (whether “the degree of force used was reasonable in the circumstances, with
proportionality being the touchstone for assessing reasonableness.”); United States v.
Black, 692 F.2d 314, 318 (4th Cir. 1982) (“Under the traditional rule, the quantum of force
which one may use in self-defense is proportional to the threat which he reasonably
apprehends . . . . Under this notion of proportionality, a danger which is not so great as to
justify an actual killing in self-defense may nevertheless be serious enough to justify an
unexecuted threat to use deadly force.”).
215. While the question of guaranteed success may be novel, there is a significant
body of literature, especially in the field of moral philosophy, about guaranteed failure of
defensive force negating the proportionality requirement – the traditional consensus has
been that futile uses of force do not count as legitimate self-defense. See Arneson, supra
note 213, at 258–59. This is called the “success condition” of proportionality. See id.
216. Force does not have to be precisely proportionate in order to satisfy the
requirements for legitimate self-defense; usually the question for courts is simply the
broad-brush question of lethal versus nonlethal force. See Rolnick, supra note 213, at 1681
(noting that “self-defense laws in most states relax this proportionality requirement
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does the elimination of the possibility of a shooter missing a shot, or the
reduced ability of the eventual victim to dodge bullets change the
proportionality of force, or is it irrelevant? The Heller decision, which
established that the Second Amendment serves a core value of individuals
arming themselves for self-defense, did not introduce a doctrinal change
to the law of self-defense and proportionality.217 In practice, however, if
more citizens have private arsenals post-Heller, defensive gun use would
likely: become more common; increase the number of self-defense
incidents falling at the high end of permissible proportionality (with
regards to force); and increase the chances that self-defense would cross
the line into disproportionate force. Some commentators have argued that
trendy “stand your ground” laws eliminate or severely limit the traditional
proportionality requirement for self-defense.218 Note that Texas law allows
private citizens to use lethal force (including a firearm) to stop a fleeing
felon or to protect property, even when the property owner is not in
danger.219 Suppose, however, that the legislature enacted such a law in a
context that included numerous tacit assumptions about probability and
certainty of success. If we assume that it is a rare event for an armed
civilian being in the right place at the right time to have a clear shot at a
fleeing felon, and that even in such a situation the civilian may miss, the
benefits of armed civilians helping catch fleeing felons in exigent
circumstances might have outweighed the contemplated benefits. But
what if a TrackingPoint weapon allows an armed civilian to potentially
call in a small, but precision-guided missile airstrike on any fleeing felon?
If the technology opens the way for many new possible scenarios, a
legislature might enact a different law, or at least a differently worded law.
The same would apply to shooting trespassers—if permitting lethal force
to defend one’s property assumed physical proximity of the property
owner and the trespasser/burglar, the situation might present very different
moral and policy concerns if we mean a guaranteed kill of someone 1400
yards away, at the outer edge of one’s land.
If law enforcement adopts these weapons, it would raise unanswered
questions about police shootings of fleeing suspects220—again, due to the
slightly, in that they permit the use of deadly force in response to a threat of death or certain
other violent crimes, most commonly robbery, rape, and kidnapping.”).
217. See Cody J. Jacobs, The Second Amendment and Private Law, 90 S. CAL. L. REV.
945, 984 (2017) (“Thus, it seems unlikely that Heller will ultimately be read to require any
change to the self-defense proportionality requirement.”).
218. See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, The Value of Life: Constitutional Limits o Citizens’
Use Of Deadly Force, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 623, 641 (2014) (“This ‘rule’ effectively
eliminates the traditional requirement that the use of force in self-defense be proportional
to the threat (i.e., that deadly force only be used to resist an imminent threat of death or
serious harm).”).
219. See Rolnick, supra note 213, at 1683.
220. See generally Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 21 (1985)(leading case on lawful
use of lethal force by police to stop fleeing suspects); Nancy C. Marcus, From Edward to
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guaranteed death of the moving target and the fleeing suspect’s inability
to dodge a bullet. The situation is analogous to those involving law
enforcement use of armed drones or bomb-carrying robots,221 and it
changes the equation for justified use of force—the officer is far enough
away to be out of immediate danger, and the likelihood of death is higher.
Traditional deference to police shootings of fleeing felons may have rested
partly on the usually tacit assumption that it is too difficult for police to
shoot precisely at a moving target in the heat of the moment, that is, too
difficult for police to ensure a shot will stop the fleeing suspect to facilitate
apprehension, rather than executing the suspect. We now have technology
that would enable the police to do just that, and I would argue that police
should have a duty not to use a guaranteed-lethal shot. At the least, the
greater the certainty that a fleeing person will die should raise the duty of
the officer to have an articulable, compelling reason to execute the person.
Fortunately, statistical data suggests that police killings have been on the
decline overall.222 As mentioned above, arming police with any type of
lethal firearms presents the same moral hazard and adverse selection
problems that guns always introduce into a situation. Police are more
likely to make risky choices when they have guns, and risky people are
more likely to become police when the police have guns. Guns with superlethality simply raise the moral hazard and adverse selection quotients.
Even the presumed value or virtue of sports shooting and hunting
comes into question when we consider a gun that does not miss. An
assortment of state and federal laws place restrictions on hunting by
methods that eliminate “fair chase” in addition to seasonal restrictions,
licenses and permits, and limits on kills.223 Federal law restricts hunting

Eric Garner and Beyond: The Importance of Constitutional Limitations on Lethal Use of
Force in Police Reform, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 53 (2016) (discussing the
development and legitimacy of police use of lethal force against fleeing suspects).
221. Some academic discussion of this question has arisen in the last year or two
following an incident where the Dallas police used a bomb-carrying robot to blow up an
armed killing-spree suspect who had barricaded himself in a building. See generally
Melissa Hamilton, Excessive Lethal Force, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1167 (2017) (criticizing
the police use of lethal force from a remote location); Thomas Wanebo, Remote Killing
and the Fourth Amendment: Updating Constitutional Law to Address Expanded Police
Lethality in the Robotic Age, 65 UCLA L. REV. 976 (2018) (criticizing the police use of
lethal force from a remote location); Michael C. Dorf, Is It Proper for Cops to Use Killer
Robots?, NEWSWEEK (July 15, 2016, 7:50 AM), https://bit.ly/2xTKNel (contending that
guns and remote-control explosives are equally legitimate for police use); Michael Nunez,
Should Police Use Robots to Kill?, GIZMODO (July 8, 2016, 6:47 PM),
https://bit.ly/2yty16H (quoting Professor Eugene Volokh in support of the police actions).
222. See Franklin E. Zimring & Brittany Arsiniega, Trends in Killings of and by
Police: A Preliminary Analysis, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 247, 250 (2015).
223. See Irus Braverman, Conservation And Hunting: Till Death Do They Part? A
Legal Ethnography of Deer Management, 30 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 143, 148–49 (2015)
(describing several laws).
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from aircraft,224 and some states have tried to limit hunting from vehicles
or “canned hunting,” trophy hunting of trapped or fenced-in animals.225
These regulations do not clearly infringe on the Second Amendment.226 As
hunting technology advances, “sport hunters have had to impose voluntary
restrictions on their ability to hunt to give the animal a chance to escape,”
which would otherwise eliminate “the essential character of the hunt.”227
Arguably, precision-guided hunting rifles—essentially guaranteed to hit
the target—approach these boundaries, although hunters still have to find
the prey and tag it, and would have to have made the prior decision to hunt
with a TrackingPoint gun. TrackingPoint rifles would be especially useful
for hunting from a vehicle or aircraft, for example, because the gun can
lock on a moving target from a long distance. Some commentators have
recently critiqued, or debunked, the conventional wisdom that hunting
helps with wildlife conservation.228 This is relevant for the larger
discussion of the morality of sports hunting, especially with precisionguided firearms.
Modern militaries use training to overcome the instinctive aversion
to killing that most people have. “Interspecies homicide,” as some military
psychologists call it,229 comes easier for normal psyches if individuals can
distance themselves from their own actions.230 The concept was developed
by Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall during World War II and was
outlined in his controversial book Men Against Fire. 231 Marshall claimed
that the ratio of rounds fired compared to hits was low because the majority
of soldiers were not actually aiming at their targets.232 Though Marshall’s
224. See Roberto Iraola, The Airborne Hunting Act, 41 No. 3 CRIM. LAW BULL. 280,
280 (2005).
225. Laura J. Ireland, Canning Canned Hunts: Using State and Federal Legislation
to Eliminate the Unethical Practice of Canned “Hunting”, 8 ANIMAL L. 223, 224 (2002)
(“[C]anned hunts are inhumane, unethical, and should not exist.”).
226. Joseph Blocher, Hunting and the Second Amendment, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
133, 137 (2015) (arguing that hunting and recreational uses of arms have, at best, a tenuous
claim to Second Amendment protection).
227. Braverman, supra note 222, at 149.
228. See, e.g., Myanna Dellinger, Trophy Hunting - A Relic of the Past, 34 J. ENVTL.
L. & LITIG. 25, 26 (2019) (arguing that “the hunting of endangered and threatened species
for mere ‘sport’ should be outlawed and that the transborder transportation of parts of
trophy-hunted animals should be more closely examined and restricted than what is
currently the case.”); Myanna Dellinger, Trophy Hunting Contracts: Unenforceable for
Reasons of Public Policy, 41 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 396 (2016); see generally Zoe
Verhoeven, Note, The Myth of Hunting as a Conservation Tool in the Crosshairs, Facing
Extinction, 95 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 68 (2018) (critiquing the purported conservation
benefits of hunting).
229. Peter Maass, A Bulletproof Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, at 52.
230. See Stephen Evans, How Soldiers Deal with the Job of Killing, BBC NEWS (June
11, 2011), https://bbc.in/2UHFI1M.
231. See generally SAMUEL LYMAN ATWOOD MARSHALL, MEN AGAINST FIRE: THE
PROBLEM OF BATTLE COMMAND (1947) ([parenthetical]).
232. See id. at 50–63.
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study has largely been discredited, his premise that the lethality of a soldier
is hindered by their inherent human aversion to killing remains the
conventional wisdom among military trainers.233 In response to Marshall’s
ideas, the military made two major changes to the way it trained
soldiers.234 First, training methods were adopted to make soldiers more
comfortable with firing at humans.235 For example, the military stopped
using bullseyes for shooting practice and instead used human-shaped cutouts.236 Today, combat training uses targets with human faces that pop up
unexpectedly. Second, exercises were modified to be more similar to
combat conditions and were repeated by soldiers “until their reactions
became second nature.”237 Modern combat drills are run with greater
frequency, under conditions far more reflective of an actual battlefield.238
The result of the new training methods is that firing at human targets has
become an almost automatic response.239 As Special Forces Master
Sergeant Danny Leonard put it: “It’s so instantaneous . . . . You don’t even
realize you did it.”240 The new generation of firearms is an extension of
that automation. “Digital fire-control systems,” like the one the Army is
seeking for new weapons orders, would allow soldiers “to engage targets
faster and with greater precision.”241 They can pair with goggles via a
wireless link, allowing the shooter to fire from behind cover.242 By making
killing more reflexive, semi-autonomous weapons take away some of the
shooter’s choice. By removing a degree of human involvement,
autonomous functions insulate, to an extent, the individual operator’s
sense of personal culpability.
Major Peter Kilner, a West Point philosophy and ethics professor,
argues that allowing soldiers to avoid confronting killing on a personal
level during battle “leave[s] them more prone to psychological traumas
after the training is finished.”243 Further, autonomous targeting impacts the
operator’s risk perception and therefore influences their decision-making

233. See Maass, supra note 228, at 52.
234. See id..
235. See id..
236. See Evans, supra note 229.
237. See Greg Jaffe, Breaking a Taboo, Army Confronts Guilt After Combat, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2005, 12:01 AM), https://on.wsj.com/2JlvQUX; Maass, supra note 228, at
52.
238. See Maass, supra note 228, at 52.
239. See id.
240. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Interview with Master Sergeant
Danny Leonard, U.S. Army Special Forces).
241. Kyle Mizokami, The Army’s Next Infantry Guns Will Have Computerized Fire
Control for Unreal Accuracy, POPULAR MECHS. (Feb. 14, 2019), https://bit.ly/33PWv5U.
242. See id.
243. Jaffe, supra note 236.
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process.244 Operators of autonomous weapons may feel empowered by the
automatic targeting functions. As TrackingPoint boasts, their PrecisionGuided Firearm (“PGF”) takes “the stress and nerves out of shooting” and
allows the shooter to focus purely on taking the shot.245 One expert warns
that individuals who possess a gun that cannot miss have less motivation
to de-escalate situations and avoid violence, preferring to rely instead on
the method with the assured outcome.246 Philosopher and ethicist Jonathan
Moreno, expressed concern that semi-autonomous weapons would
provide authorities with a shortcut around hostage and standoff
negotiations.247 “If their intuition says this guy is not going to engage in a
conversation very long . . . would that make them feel more comfortable
using the weapon?”248
“Responsibility gap” is the term some researchers use to describe the
complications of ascribing liability for injury resulting from a decision that
was made in part by a person and in part by autonomous technology.249
Autonomous weapons grant untrained, novice shooters the reflexivity and
emotional distance associated with military engagement and the precision
of a master marksman. Of course, as TrackingPoint points out in their
promotional materials, their firearms are not fully autonomous.250 After the
shooter makes the initial targeting decisions, TrackingPoint firearms
control the decision to take the final shot.
Before closing this section, it is worth mentioning an even newer, but
more modest, variation on guns that cannot miss: another new product line
by Australian gunmaker Radetec, mentioned above. Radetec makes a nonobtrusive attachment for a few popular models of firearms (such as a
Glock handgun or an AR-15) that will fire only when pointed at an
electronically-designated target downrange.251 This product is meant for
shooting ranges and shooting schools, and avoids stray off-target shots (by
amateur shooters or accidental un-aimed discharges) from injuring others
or even from wasting rounds that would not land somewhere on the target.
244. See R.J. Knighton, The Psychology of Risk and Its Role in Military Decision‐
Making, 4 DEFENCE STUD. 309, 311–13 (2004)(discussing risk and decision-making
generally).
245. See Brian Anderson, Long Shot: Inside the Scope of Smart Weapons, VICE
(Sept. 23, 2013, 1:05 PM), https://bit.ly/2QS5zSs.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Interview with Jonathan Moreno,
Philosopher & Ethicist, Ctr. For Am. Progress).
249. See Thompson Chengeta, Accountability Gap: Autonomous Weapon Systems
and Modes of Responsibility in International Law, 45 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 1
(2016).
250. See Anderson, supra note 244.
251. See Safe Shooting Range, RADETEC, https://bit.ly/39pRa6j (last visited May 19,
2020); see also Andrew Tuohy, Smart Guns Are Coming and They Scare the Crap Out of
Me, OMAHA OUTDOORS (Jan. 27, 2019), https://bit.ly/3asDDMz.
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The product is affordable (a few hundred dollars). For shooting ranges and
schools, Radetec has a system that allows a trainer to disable all the trainee
guns in the line at once, a very useful feature when giving instructions to
the group. It is easy to imagine Radetec’s products having consumer
appeal for armories, shootings ranges, and shooting schools (including
police academies and military training bases), and there could be
secondary or spillover benefits for the gun community generally.
IV. GUNS THAT TRACK EVERYTHING
Another line of emerging firearm technology is digital tracking of a
gun’s location, movements, and discharge. Products are already on the
market that offer audio/video uploads from the scope, but the more
sophisticated technology has nuanced movement tracking, similar to the
“black box” in an automobile that constantly records speed, acceleration,
braking, and turns. These are firearms or firearm attachments that can
record the movements, location, and time/direction of discharge. Such
record-creation and archiving of data could raise accountability for law
enforcement, similar to the policy rationales for police bodycams,252 and
also enhance justifications for shootings, validating a subsequent claim of
self-defense by a civilian gun owner. Documenting that a shooting was
justified could be beneficial if it protects police, and even private gun
owners, from wrongful accusations or prosecution. On the other hand, an
ex-ante belief that it will be easier to show the legitimacy of a shooting
after the fact can subconsciously make police or private gun owners less
hesitant or more likely to take a questionable shot, which is not necessarily
a good thing.
Some of these technologies overlap with what gun safety advocates
wanted with their version of “smart guns.” But the TrackingPoint guns,
which also boast this technology, are clearly more lethal, but not
necessarily safer. Some of these recordkeeping guns—whether marketready, prototypes, or merely concepts—use blockchain ledger technology
for recordkeeping and security, which Part V will address separately. For
purposes of this section, it is enough to note that recordkeeping guns may
or may not use blockchain; and that some use (or propose to use) audiovideo feeds uploaded to the Internet. Conversely, blockchain technology
is a core component of a wide range of firearm-related new technologies,
so it deserves a separate section.
One recent legal commentator explained the usefulness for police of
firearm tracking technology this way:

252. See Colin Neagle, How the Internet of Things Is Transforming Law
Enforcement, NETWORK WORLD (Nov. 3, 2014, 9:33 AM), https://bit.ly/2QTyky1.
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[The Internet of Things] will also be beneficial for local law
enforcement. For example, Yardarm Technologies has developed
smart firearms, accessories, and sensor technology that can monitor
and record data each time the weapon is discharged. Some police
departments, including Santa Cruz, California, and Carrollton, Texas,
have started to test these devices, and the smart guns also contain either
biometric fingerprint sensor technology on the triggers, or smart
bracelets that use RFID microchips, such that only the assigned officer
is able to discharge the weapon.253

A startup called Justifire254 has a product based on the same idea, but
in reverse, as having smart guns track police use to help hold officers
accountable for shootings (the gun automatically records every movement,
trigger pull, angle, location, etc.). Justifire is for civilian gun owners who
plan to use their guns to kill in self-defense and worry that they will face
criminal charges afterward (or a wrongful death suit)255 if nobody believes
their version of what transpired. These gun attachments work with existing
handguns and record everything—gun movement and location, firing, and
even audio/visual.256 There is already inferential evidence for current
consumer demand for such technology: the existing market for gun
owner’s legal insurance.
More limited internal tracking is available from Radetec, an
Australian firearm manufacturer. Radetec sells attachments (costing
$139–$299) for existing 1911s, Beretta handguns, and AR-15s that
provide a digital display on one side of the weapon to show how many
rounds remain in the magazine,257 or (in a replacement slide on the butt of
the handgun) how many shots the gun has fired,258 which is useful for
maintenance purposes. The latter is analogous to an odometer on a car,
253. Kester, supra note 6, at 215 (citing Neagle, supra note 251).
254. See
Blackbox
Environmental
Recording
Device,
JUSTIFIRE,
https://bit.ly/2UBPqSb (last visited May 19, 2020) (calling the product a “Blackbox for
your handgun”).
255. See id.
256. Referring to Justifire’s website, Erik Gibbs provided some additional
information on how the device works:
[The device] captures and funnels audio, video, barometric pressure, altitude,
temperature and 3 axes of accelerometer, gyroscopic, and magnetic data at all
times, it only saves this information if specific event characteristics are met.
Qualifying event characteristics such as aiming at a human target or firing your
weapon instantly plug Justifire[‘]s data funnel and the device automatically saves
and encrypts all information leading up to and after an event.
Erik Gibbs, Blockchains could revolutionize the use of firearms, COINGEEK (July 31, 2019),
https://bit.ly/2JgcX61 (quoting the Justifire webite) (internal quotation marks omitted).
257. See Digital Counter, RADETEC, https://bit.ly/3bkyxSD (last visited May 19,
2020).
258. See RISC, RADETEC, https://bit.ly/33G0RMI (last visited May 19, 2020); see
also Ivan Loomis, Digital Round-Count Display for Your Glock! Radetec’s Smart Slide –
SHOT Show 2019, GUNS AM. DIG. (Jan. 28, 2019), https://bit.ly/3bnmy6K; Tuohy, supra
note 250.

734

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 124:3

which helps owners stay on an optimal maintenance schedule for oil
changes, tune-ups, and other parts replacement.
V.

BLOCKCHAIN AND GLOCKCHAIN

Blockchain is a newer type of digital ledger technology (“DLT”), best
known for its association with Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies.259 Like
many disruptive technologies—which first capture the public imagination
or garner headlines—a certain amount of hype has surrounded
blockchain.260 For readers unfamiliar with blockchain, it is a type of
decentralized, verifiable digital recordkeeping, a bit like a cross between
a notary public and the practice of emailing a backup of an important
document to ten different trustworthy friends who are always online (an
obvious oversimplification). Blockchain often incorporates encryption
and multiple-location independent backups of the data to help make the
information more invulnerable to malicious manipulation, data loss, or
unauthorized access. Blockchain and other DLTs can function as an
unalterable, automatically recorded ledger of specific events or
occurrences.261 It facilitates both trust and privacy in a world of
anonymous or international transactions.
A few academic researchers have proposed ways that blockchain
technology could work with firearm sales, usage, or firearm regulation.262
Several tech blogs subsequently reported on this or promoted it,263 and
some of the next-generation smart gun startups incorporated blockchain at

259. For helpful, even-handed background on blockchain, digital ledger technologies,
and cryptocurrencies, see Harish Natarajan et al., Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT)
and blockchain (World Bank Grp., Working Paper No. 122140, 2017); see also What is
blockchain?, IBM, https://bit.ly/3dlN3vf (last visited May 19, 2020).
260. For example, Kodak and Long Island Ice Tea both announced entrance into the
cryptocurrency world and preemptively changed their names to include the word
“blockchain,” saw immediate jumps in their stock prices. See Chuck Jones, Kodak And
Long Island Ice Tea Embracing Blockchain Is Just Like Dot Com In 1999. It Didn’t End
Well, FORBES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://bit.ly/2UuT93T.
261. See Metzler, supra note 2, at 111 (“Blockchain is a technology that establishes
a ledger that cannot be altered after an occurrence has been recorded.”).
262. See id.; Matt Ledder, Capstone Project: Blockchain for Gun Safety, 21–37
(2019) (unpublished report) (on file with the Georgetown Library Repository); Thomas F.
Heston, A Blockchain Solution to Gun Control, 3–7 (Nov. 13, 2017) (unpublished article),
available at https://bit.ly/3dCBz70.
263. See John Brixius, Blockchain Completely Alters The Gun Debate, MEDIUM
(Mar. 8, 2019), https://bit.ly/2QDAt0A; Kristin Houser, Here’s How Blockchain Could Be
Used for Gun Control, FUTURISM (Feb. 27, 2018), https://bit.ly/2UaGm7Q; Sissi Cao,
Blockchain Could Improve Gun Control—But Lawmakers Hate the Idea, OBSERVER (Feb.
22, 2018, 5:22 PM), https://bit.ly/39jY3Gw; Sam Mire, Blockchain In The Firearms
Industry: 6 Possible Use Cases, DISRUPTOR DAILY (Nov. 15, 2018), https://bit.ly/2J6iD2m;
see also Ariel Schwartz, Every bullet this gun fires would be automatically tracked in a
database–here’s why, BUS. INSIDER (July 12, 2016), https://bit.ly/2UrSIHA.
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the core of their product idea.264 One group of researchers, under the
auspices of Ideo coLab, gave their project the catchy name
“Glockchain,”265 though the project is unrelated to the firearms
manufacturer known as Glock.
The Glockchain project aims to incorporate DLT into a firearm so
that it records each time the gun fires, along with its precise location, and
the blockchain records are completely secure and accurate.266 The
developers had police in mind as the potential users of this product to
augment police accountability when a police shooting occurs with a
service weapon.267 If a rampaging active shooter were using gun
technology (which seems incredibly unlikely), police could theoretically
have a faster response time and could more easily identify the shooter,
especially if the active shooter used the feature to broadcast his shot
numbers through social media during his rampage.268 This is a type of
guns-that-track-everything, discussed in the previous Part,269 that uses
blockchain technology for its recordkeeping. The most promising use for
this product is for the police and the military. For the police, this could
provide increased accountability and/or validation (and, hence,
legitimacy) in the same way that bodycams do. This technology helps
military officers and commanders see through the chaos of the battlefield
and identify which of their soldiers is firing and from where; it would also
help prevent or track desertions, defections, lost or stolen munitions, and
so on.
Other researchers have published or circulated manuscripts detailing
a blockchain-based replacement for the firearm purchase background
check system in the United States.270 The proposals each have some
variations, but all include some type of blockchain registry or ledger for
every firearm, either with built-in automatic recording and ledger
technology or based on the existing embossed serial number system,
combined with a blockchain owner or user registry or blockchain wallet.
The goal of these proposals is primarily to enable law enforcement tracing
of crime guns, but each of the proposals contemplates replacing the
existing FBI National Instant Background Check System (“NICS”). This
replacement background check system would have a decentralized
264. See The World’s First Blockchain Gun Diary, GUNIARY, https://bit.ly/2UzLMbw
(last visited May 19, 2020); see also Blockchain completely changes the firearms debate:
FAABS is a proposal for a Win-Win solution for moderates on both sides, FAABS.ORG,
https://bit.ly/2xOxhZC (last visited May 19, 2020).
265. See Schwartz, supra note 262.
266. See Metzler, supra note 2, at 111.
267. See id. at 11 n.53; see also Schwartz, supra note 262.
268. See Metzler, supra note 2, at 127.
269. See supra Part IV.
270. For the most serious examples, see Heston, supra note 262, at 3–7; The World’s
First Blockchain Gun Diary, supra note 263; Ledder, supra note 262, at 21–37.
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blockchain verification system for ensuring that only authorized users can
purchase or carry firearms,271 although some bloggers envision a
blockchain system to feed the data directly into the NICS database, making
it much more accurate and comprehensive. The Firearm Accountability
Auditability Blockchain Solution (“FAABS”) system would create a
private-sector decentralized registry of gun owners (federal statutes
prohibit the federal government from creating a gun owner registry,
though states may currently do this, such as California). It would also help
with “police spot checks”—officers who encounter someone with a gun
could immediately verify if the individual is a lawful possessor.272 FAABS
is a private nonprofit. The advantage of a private-sector voluntary registry
is that no state action could implicate constitutional concerns (i.e., Second
Amendment), nor would private actors violate the federal statutory
prohibition on a government-operated gun registry.273
These proposals rest on some dubious assumptions, or simple
misunderstandings, about millions of gun owners in America (many of
who are vehemently opposed to any type of gun owner registry, as they
believe it inevitably leads to a gun confiscation), and the number of guns
already in circulation (estimated to be more than the total population of
the United States). Most prohibited purchasers are convicted felons,
wanted fugitives, and undocumented immigrants. Those prohibited
purchasers adjudicated as mentally impaired and those dishonorably
discharged from the military, grouped together, form a smaller group than
the first three categories. Normally, members of these groups (especially
convicted felons) know that they cannot pass a background check, and
would simply steal or borrow someone’s firearm or pay a premium to an
aftermarket seller who would agree not to record the transaction to the
blockchain ledger. Unless all current gun owners voluntarily comply with
using a system of non-governmental blockchain tracking, using
blockchain to trace guns requires replacing the more than 300 million
firearms already in circulation with guns that have automatic blockchain
recording—an unrealistic suggestion, both politically and financially. The
current guns in circulation will continue in circulation for decades, unless
the government undertakes a massive confiscation-buyback or an outright
ban. The hostility to blockchain registries and gun tracking is evident in
the 2017 Arizona statute prohibiting the implementation of any such

271. See Ledder, supra note 261, at 5–8; see also Heston, supra note 261, at 5–7
(adding the additional view that we could finally derive an accurate count of the number
of guns in circulation).
272. See Brixius, supra note 262.
273. See 18 U.S.C. § 926(a) (2018).
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system.274 The proposals emphasize that the blockchain encryption would
protect the privacy of gun owners, but not as much as if the owners simply
refused to participate, that is, to stay off-grid from the blockchain ledger.
Unfortunately, national gun owner registries are simply a non-starter in the
United States under current laws and partisan platforms. Some of the
writers on this subject even suggest that hackers could currently discover
who does not own a gun, so that criminals could target non-owners. But
this assumes that there is an existing registry of gun owners (there is not)
that would allow those with access to make such a determination by
elimination.
Similarly, a recurring suggestion through all the commentary about
blockchain and background checks is that it would help the background
check system to be hacker-proof and more accurate. However, there are
no reported incidents of anyone hacking into the NICS databases, either to
modify or delete unfavorable records. There is no reason for anyone to do
so. A prohibited person (someone falling under one of the nine prohibiting
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) is still under the legal prohibition even if
their information is missing from the NICS system—a felon-in-possession
is still a felon-in-possession if they have a felony conviction and have a
gun. Deleting one’s information from the NICS database would not make
it legal for a prohibited person to purchase or own a gun. Moreover, any
prohibited persons undeterred by the legal prohibition can easily purchase
used firearms from private unlicensed sellers without undergoing any
background check. There is no current problem with security breaches of
the NICS databases. Regarding accuracy, a 2017 report of an audit by the
Office of the Inspector General found that the background checks are
currently around 98% or 99% accurate, so there is room for improvement,
but not much. NICS suffers from staffing shortages and underreporting of
new records by courts, local law enforcement, and mental health care
providers (all of which are already improving), but not from a significant
percentage of mistakes.
It is easier to imagine that gun owners with large collections—
especially if they buy, sell, and lend frequently—might want to use the
Guniary app or Radetec Armorer Logbook275 to keep an inventory of their
weapons and ammunition. Armories, shooting ranges, and shooting
schools, which often have guns available for rental or temporary use, are
also easy to envision as users of a blockchain-based tracking system like
Guniary or even FAABS. It also seems within the realm of possibility that
274. See H.B. 2216, 53d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2017). The Arizona statute
imposes criminal sanctions (felony grade) for a public official who creates a law requiring
digital ledgering technology for tracking firearms. See id.
275. See Armorer Logbook, RADETEC, https://bit.ly/2QLtumv (last visited May 19,
2020). Because Radetec’s Armorer Logbook does not claim to use blockchain technology,
so I mention it only in passing in this section.
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some states would require—either through legislation or regulation—that
shooting ranges and shooting schools use such a system. Similarly, it is
certainly possible that at some point the FBI would incorporate blockchain
technology into its NICS databases, NICS instant background checks by
licensed gun dealers, or to streamline records uploading from local law
enforcement and local courts, though other automatic reporting software
might accomplish the same thing more efficiently than blockchain.
Another promising application for private-sector blockchain
registries is voluntary self-registration of conscientious nonowners—those
conscientiously opposed to gun ownership, who want to signal their
convictions and commitment to the renunciation of gun rights. A
companion article276 to this one argues for a system of voluntary selfenlistment in the NICS database for those who do not want to buy or
possess guns for moral reasons. Ian Ayers and Fred Vars have argued for
a similar self-registration for suicidal individuals, and their proposal has
become a reality in Washington state via legislative enactment.277 Gun
rights repudiation requires a system of verification or certification to give
gravitas and credibility to the decision to renounce firearm ownership
permanently. This credibility and gravitas are necessary for renunciation
to serve exemplary purposes for influencing social norms, fostering
cohesiveness and identity within the gunless movement, and moral selfsignaling. Government registration and certification of nonowners
voluntarily seems to be the most powerful way to accomplish this, but a
decentralized blockchain self-registry could be a viable second-best
option, though it would not achieve the goal of rendering oneself unable
to purchase a gun or subject to firearm forfeiture, as a governmentsponsored system would.
VI. CONCLUSION
The emerging technology with firearms has branched in different
directions, so that we can no longer refer to smart guns as a monolithic
item. Some are safer, while others are more dangerous; some are a new
type of weapon, while others are attachable and detachable with older
mechanical firearms. Although consumers might prefer safety features on
many products, with firearms there is a longstanding divergence between

276. See Drury Stevenson, Going Gunless, 85 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
277. See generally Ian Ayres & Fredrick E. Vars, Libertarian Gun Control, 167 U.
PA. L. REV. 921, 922–23 (2019) (discussing legislative implementation or proposals in
various states); Fredrick E. Vars, Not Young Guns Anymore: Dementia and the Second
Amendment, 25 ELDER L.J. 51 (2017)(discussing proposal to help elderly individuals avoid
dementia-related suicide); Angela Selvaggio & Fredrick E. Vars, “Bind Me More Tightly
Still”: Voluntary Restraint Against Gun Suicide, 53 HARV. J. LEGIS. 671 (2016) (legislative
proposal to allow suicidal individuals to register for a do-not-sell list for firearms); Fredrick
E. Vars, Self-Defense Against Gun Suicide, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1465 (2015) (same).
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the market-driven advances in technology and the policy-driven pushes for
new development. The market demand drives the technology toward
cheaper, more lethal, and more convenient to carry guns. The policy
agenda, of course, moves toward reducing injuries and deaths, which
impose high social costs. The tensions presented by new firearm
technology are an outgrowth of the collective action problem or tragedy
of the commons inherent in safety and security. Safety and security are a
public good; low rates of violence are part of this public good.278 Arming
oneself for one’s safety and security could maximize an individual’s good,
but a completely unarmed community would have less violence overall,
or at least less lethal violence. If guns are good at all, it is under a Theory
of Second Best, a type of necessary evil.
Electronically personalized guns—what most people mean when
they refer to “smart guns”—could help reduce gun injuries and deaths,
especially for children and teens, but they would certainly not solve
everything, or even most of the gun deaths. It may be worth encouraging
the development of the technology to save a few hundred lives per year,
but advocates (and politicians) should not overpromise what the
technology could achieve. Personalized smart guns would be unlikely to
have much impact on the horrific rampage of shootings in schools and
other places crowded with innocent, unsuspecting civilians. Personalized
smart guns, even if popular, may have little impact on domestic gun
violence and elderly suicides (which comprise a huge share of annual gun
deaths) or on interpersonal revenge.
Technology also affects public morality by providing new
comparison benchmarks. Precision-guided guns, due to their infallible
lethality, might make traditional, mechanical guns seem more legitimate
by comparison. It may be that the greatest harm presented by precisionguided firearms is not how the owners use them, but that they make other
guns seem (deceptively) harmless, tame, and unremarkable. This would
depend on the guns becoming well-known to the public and assimilated
into the cultural semiotics of weaponry, which does not necessarily
correlate to the number of guns in circulation. TrackingPoint guns and
their progeny may remain an exotic luxury item for a long time, but if they
capture a place in the public imagination, they could have an adverse
influence as a comparison. Conversely, personalized smart guns could
make regular guns seem reckless and unsafe by comparison, even if the
smart guns never become the norm, as long as the public awareness or the
salience of the item in the public’s imagination about weaponry becomes
entrenched.
278. For an excellent discussion of the aggregate effects of firearm prevalence or
paucity on a community, see Powell v. State, No. 18-CV-6675, 2019 WL 4750265, at *2–
*4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2019).
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Recordkeeping and blockchain-enabled guns are likely to become
more common, both for gun hobbyists (in the same way that wristband
fitness trackers are appealing for exercise enthusiasts), police, military,
and private security organizations that use software for tracking and restocking ammunition inventory, firearm maintenance and replacement
schedules, and so on. Many law enforcement and military organizations
auction or sell their old firearms when they replace their inventory, so
firearm features popular with these large-volume purchaser entities
become familiar to gun dealers and private gun purchasers as well. I
believe the main effect in the foreseeable future will be more efficiency in
inventory management for such entities as well as administrative
efficiency in law enforcement and military entities, bringing some savings
to taxpayers. More speculatively, recordkeeping guns could eventually
impact target practice behaviors and, indirectly, the shooting range
industry, as these entities (as well as gun hobbyists) become more aware
or self-conscious of the number of rounds they are using for practice, and
the wear and tear that shooting range practice has on each firearm.
None of the emerging technologies address the underlying moral
dubiousness with killing in self-defense or defense of property, the
immorality of sports hunting, the immorality of playing a part in a larger
breakdown in collective action, or the erosion of a public good, like a
nonviolent community. Even if the majority of jurists, or the majority of
voters, believe that it is morally acceptable to kill another person when
confronted with an immediate, unavoidable choice between the two lives
(a view I do not share), such discourse merely deflects the harder questions
of whether defensive gun use is an excusable, forgivable act or a virtuous,
heroic one; or whether killing to save one’s own life, or the life of a loved
one, is moral when nonlethal alternatives might also have worked. Gun
ownership for self-defense not only presents moral hazard and adverse
selection problems, but also a crowding-out phenomenon as well as an
individual under-investment in nonlethal force (say, a taser or a bat), locks
and alarms, cultivating cautious and circumspect habits, and having an
escape plan. A legal right to use lethal force in self-defense does not equal
a moral right to do so, and even a moral right to kill does not equal a moral
obligation. Zero guns would be better than smart guns.

